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INTRODUCTION
Enforcement of civil public law is on a precipice. Federal
statutes in the areas of discrimination, antitrust, securities, the
workplace, education, consumer and environmental protection,
and more include what are known as “hybrid” enforcement
schemes.1 Hybrid enforcement describes statutes in which Congress created both public and private mechanisms for enforcing
the law by establishing both a federal government agency and a
private right of action with incentives to encourage citizen litigation.2 Since the creation of most hybrid statutes in the 1960s,
federal government agencies and private plaintiffs’ attorneys
have each played their part in litigating violations of civil public
laws.3 Over the past decade, however, each half of the hybrid enforcement equation has been slowly and consistently squeezed.
On the private side, procedural jurisprudence on pleading
standards, class action doctrine, and mandatory arbitration
have dramatically reshaped private enforcers’ access to the federal courts.4 Meanwhile, on the public side, new levels of economic and political pressure on legislators and executive branch
officials, exacerbated by recent jurisprudence on political contri-

1. See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 637, 687 (2013).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See infra Part II.A; see also, e.g., Judicial Caseload Indicators - Federal
Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/
judicial-caseload-indicators-federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018 [https://
perma.cc/FKY4-TA2X] (showing an 8.8% decline in civil cases filed in district
courts between 2014 and 2018).
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butions, have shifted the federal government somewhat irretrievably toward deregulation.5 The hybrid systems written into
our most important federal statutes, designed with two enforcement options to ensure that individuals’ rights would be protected, are no longer able to function as Congress envisioned.
Over the past two decades, legal scholars have focused increasing attention on hybrid enforcement schemes in public law.
A significant body of scholarship has now studied many aspects
of each parallel track of hybrid models—for example, measuring
the success of private incentives to litigate or theorizing optimal
enforcement agency design.6 Some scholars argue in favor of gov-

5. See infra Part II.B; see also Enforcement Annual Results Analysis and
Trends for Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www
.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-annual-results-analysis-and-trends-fiscal
-year-2017 [https://perma.cc/A7LC-2USW] (showing a nearly fifty percent drop
in civil enforcement cases filed by the EPA, from 3,762 cases initiated in FY
2007 to 1,938 cases initiated in FY 2017); EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997
through FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www
.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm [https://perma.cc/4LXT
-UVSN] (showing a general trend of decline in litigation filed by the EEOC from
403 and 362 cases filed in FYs 2006 and 2007 to 114 and 201 cases filed in FYs
2016 and 2017).
6. See infra Part I.A. The literature on public and private enforcement
mechanisms in U.S. civil law is vast. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL & FUTURE (2015) [hereinafter COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION]; SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC
REGULATION & PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010) [hereinafter FARHANG,
LITIGATION STATE]; Burbank et al., supra note 1; Stephen B. Burbank & Sean
Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543
(2014); Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND.
L. REV. 285 (2016); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General:
Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV.
215 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG]; David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013); David
Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from
Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244 (2012) [hereinafter Engstrom,
Harnessing the Private AG]; Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering
in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2000); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (2000) [hereinafter Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform]; Myriam Gilles, Can John Coffee Rescue the Private
Attorney General? Lessons from the Credit Card Wars, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1001
(2016) [hereinafter Gilles, Can Coffee Rescue?]; Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012) [hereinafter Gilles & Friedman, After Class];
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ernment enforcement or public oversight of private plaintiffs’ attorneys;7 others prefer private litigation or view public enforcement bureaucracy as problematic.8 For the most part, however,
the scholarship reflects the reality that each enforcement path
is separate. Articles examine or argue for the dominance of either public or private enforcement mechanisms, but start from
the presumption that never the two shall meet.9
The leading thread of this scholarship arose in the mid1980s, rooted in law and economics arguments that statutory incentives for private enforcement had been distorted by private
class action attorneys who put their own profits before the interests of the clients they represented.10 Concerns for abusive class
actions sparked a movement of “litigation reform” that laid the

Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103
(2006) [hereinafter Gilles & Freidman, Exploding the Myth]; J. Maria Glover,
The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339
(2012); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REV. 183 (2003); David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.
J. 777 (2016); William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—
And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, 72 VAND. L. REV. 425 (2019); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing
and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401 (1998); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93 (2005).
7. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 287–88, nn.5–7 (citing, e.g., Jaime Dodge,
Privatizing Mass Settlement, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 335, 375 (2014); Coffee,
Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6; Erichson, supra note 6; Rubenstein, supra note 6).
8. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 287–88, nn. 9–11 (citing, e.g., Stephen M.
Johnson, Sue and Settle: Demonizing the Environmental Citizen Suit, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 891, 906 (2014); William H. Pryor, Jr., A Comparison of Abuses
and Reforms of Class Actions and Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REV.
1885, 1909 (2000); Selmi, supra note 6).
9. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 285 (“[S]ubstantial literature on private
and public enforcement . . . typically treats government agencies and private
attorneys general as substitutes rather than complements.”); id. at 291 (describing public and private enforcement “as engaged in a zero-sum contest for enforcement jurisdiction”). The notable exception is Clopton’s recent work on the
benefits of “redundant” enforcement. See generally Clopton, supra note 6.
10. See generally Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6; infra Part
II.A.
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foundation for procedural restrictions on class action doctrine.11
More recently, the fire of litigation reform spread, inspiring U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence that has intensified pleading
standards in federal courts and increasingly compelled mandatory arbitration to remove claims from federal courts entirely.12
As a result, many scholars now fear that the pendulum has
swung too far in the other direction, limiting access to federal
courts for all, including those seeking crucial private enforcement of public law.13
Yet while scholars have warned of the consequences of procedural jurisprudence that limits private enforcement, they have
largely missed a simultaneous pressure being exerted on the
public side of hybrid enforcement regimes. The same deregulatory instincts that spawned limitations on private class actions
have taken greater political hold, limiting federal agency budgets and threatening public enforcement, too.14 Executive branch
preferences have always varied between Democratic and Republican presidential administrations, leading to ebbs and flows in
the level of monetary support for regulatory enforcement.15 But
recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence affecting campaign financing has likely changed this natural progression.16 The Court
has now placed its thumb on the scale in favor of unlimited corporate campaign contributions and against labor union dues.17
As a result, most legislators and executive branch appointees
now likely feel intense pressure to limit public regulatory enforcement, at least for the foreseeable future.18 If, as legal scholars have suggested, private enforcement litigation is “on the
ropes,”19 political and financial support for government regulatory enforcement may now be down for the count.
Both sides of hybrid public-private enforcement regimes are
now so seriously constrained that weakened parallel enforcement efforts may no longer be enough to secure crucial public
laws. This Article seeks to offer a new approach focusing on
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra notes 203–05 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra notes 254–67 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 658.
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whether and how parallel enforcement tracks can merge to form
points of super-hybrid “co-enforcement”:20 public and private enforcement attorneys working together in a co-equal, collaborative fashion. The term “co-enforcement” was coined by political
scientist and labor scholar Janice Fine and her colleagues to describe workers’ organizations and government enforcement
agencies collaborating to better enforce labor law standards for
vulnerable workers.21 This Article looks to and adapts the concept to a wider swath of public-private enforcement partnerships, and does so in the context of litigation. It conceives of federal public agency and private plaintiffs’ attorneys working
together to litigate jointly a variety of public law statutes. As
such, the Article draws from the theoretical and empirical work
of Fine and builds upon that of legal scholars of hybrid enforcement mechanisms to offer a pragmatic approach to resolve access to justice problems.
But this Article’s proposal is different from those of legal
scholars who call for greater public oversight over private attorney “agents” to whom public enforcement work is delegated or
outsourced by government “principals.”22 Instead, it proposes cocounseling arrangements in which both parties collaborate as
equals and fund their own efforts, not to correct the excesses of
rent-seeking private attorneys general but rather to ensure access to justice for the public interest.23 In doing so, this Article
seeks to respond to two urgent challenges in the enforcement of
civil laws that protect the public. On the one hand is a well-documented decline in private individuals’ access to the courts due
20. As discussed infra notes 97–106 and accompanying text, the concept of
“co-enforcement” is adapted from the work of Janice Fine and her colleagues,
who coined the term to describe collaboration between workers’ organizations
and government agencies responsible for labor law enforcement. See Janice
Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership with Civil Society: Can Co-enforcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed?, 45 POL. & SOC’Y 359, 362–
63 (2017) [hereinafter Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards]; Janice Fine, New Approaches to Enforcing Labor Standards: How Co-enforcement Partnerships Between Government and Civil Society Are Showing the Way Forward, 2017 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 143, 146–47 (2018), [hereinafter Fine, New Approaches]; see also
Seema N. Patel & Catherine L. Fisk, California Co-Enforcement Initiatives that
Facilitate Worker Organizing, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 3–4 (2017).
21. See Fine, New Approaches, supra note 20; Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20; see also infra notes 97–106 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 107–17 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part III.
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to a decade of civil procedure jurisprudence that has intensified
pleading requirements, narrowed class action rules, and increasingly embraced arbitration.24 On the other is a challenge with
which scholars have largely yet to grapple: a new level of financial and political pressure on legislators and the executive
branch pushing directly away from public enforcement of civil
laws and toward deregulation.25
While there are countless areas of overlap between civil law
enforcement at both the state and federal levels, this Article focuses on one specific area ripe for coordination: federal statutes
that authorize both a federal agency to enforce the statute
against violators and individuals to enforce their own private
rights of action for their injuries arising out of the same harms.
This focus may include what are known as “citizen suits” or
plaintiffs’ attorneys acting as “private attorneys general” where
private litigation seeks to remedy both the plaintiffs’ own harm
and deter violators.26 But it excludes both “qui tam” suits in
which individuals stand in the shoes of the government to enforce statutes for a bounty or reward and “parens patriae” suits
in which the government stands in as a representative to redress
the harms of its citizens.27 While the latter involve crossover between public and private enforcement, they are beyond this Article’s focus on coordination in traditional hybrid federal statutory enforcement between agencies and individuals seeking to
remedy the same harms through litigation for the purpose of effectively protecting the public.
This Article develops an argument grounded in both theory
and necessity for merging public and private enforcement and
considers the potential for applying such an approach trans-substantively to a variety of federal public laws.28 Part I explores
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 294.
27. See id., at 293–95; infra Part I.B.1.
28. In a prior work, I documented how, in the five-year wake of the 2008
Great Recession, both public and private mechanisms for enforcing Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became increasingly constrained, due to recessionary budget cuts on the public side and a “procedural recession” in private plaintiffs’ access to the federal courts. See Stephanie Bornstein, Rights in Recession:
Toward Administrative Antidiscrimination Law, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 119
(2014). I proposed a model for combining public and private Title VII enforcement and using administrative procedures under existing law more robustly—
what I called “administrative antidiscrimination law.” See id.
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the theoretical framework to support a co-enforcement litigation
model. Is co-enforcement a sound idea in theory to meet our goals
for how a public law enforcement system should be designed? It
reviews political and economic theories that led to existing hybrid models, then applies those theories to integrated, rather
than separate and parallel, enforcement. Part II makes the normative case for pursuing a collaborative approach. Even if coenforcement is sound in theory, is a change to the status quo of
hybrid enforcement necessary? It focuses on the need to integrate public and private enforcement forces due to recent economic, political, and jurisprudential constraints on both public
and private enforcers. Part III provides a doctrinal and practical
framework for how such points of co-enforcement could occur. If
hybrid integration is a sound and necessary idea, how do we actually move toward co-enforcement? It looks at examples from
statutes that authorize hybrid enforcement and proposes how to
foster collaborative partnerships between related federal agencies and private plaintiffs’ attorney enforcers.
Ultimately, the Article concludes, litigation reform and procedural jurisprudence have weakened private enforcement at
the same time that a deregulatory fervor and new political pressures have weakened public enforcement. To ensure that critical
public laws are enforced adequately may now require integrating both constrained halves of the parallel hybrid enforcement
equation.
I. THEORETICAL BASIS FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE
CO-ENFORCEMENT
This Part provides the theoretical basis for a proposal of
public-private co-enforcement of public law. It asks whether a coenforcement approach is a good idea in theory given the goals
behind existing hybrid enforcement design. It begins by defining
“hybrid” enforcement for the purposes of this Article and highlighting existing scholarship on the political and economic theories that supported the development of hybrid enforcement
schemes. It then considers what impact moving to integrated,
rather than parallel and separate, enforcement would have on
the same rationales, to provide a theoretical grounding for a coenforcement approach. This Part concludes with a response to
potential theory-based counterarguments.
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A. HYBRID ENFORCEMENT THEORY
Drawing on the work of several legal scholars, this Section
provides an operational definition of “hybrid” public-private enforcement and highlights key political and economic rationales
that gave rise to its development in U.S. law.
1. Defining “Hybrid” Enforcement
To propose a framework for combining the two halves of the
existing “hybrid” enforcement scheme requires first defining “hybrid” enforcement. Public and private enforcement overlaps in a
wide array of the American legal system in both state and federal law.29 Several legal scholars have provided helpful taxonomies from which this Article draws.
In a recent work, Zachary Clopton traced the long history
and wide reach of “redundant authority,” detailing “enforcement
schemes in which public and private actors may maintain separate but overlapping suits seeking the same remedies for the
same conduct” that may be “mutually preclusive.”30 Clopton
identified a continuum with three main categories.31 On one end
of the spectrum, he placed public actors seeking to enforce private rights—for example, parens patriae suits brought by state
attorneys general on behalf of their citizens against tobacco, firearms, or asbestos manufacturers.32 On the other end, he placed
private actors seeking to enforce what seem like public rights—
for example, qui tam suits under the False Claims Act brought
by private citizens on behalf of the government against contractors engaged in fraud, for a share of the recovery.33 Here, he also
29. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 291 (identifying the “substantial and growing literature comparing public and private enforcement of law” and citing
scholarship). Even focusing on only federal statutes that authorize private actors to sue, the field is vast. In a detailed study, Stephen Burbank, Sean Farhang, and Herbert Kritzer mapped 400 federal statutory enforcement schemes
enacted between 1947 and 2002 and identified that nearly one-quarter (100)
allowed for private enforcement and over twenty cases had “hybrid . . . regimes,”
enacting private alongside government lawsuits or administrative actions. Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 685–87. Statutes allowing private enforcement of
government policy, they noted, may reach “a virtually limitless array of policy
areas,” including banking, discrimination, health and safety, the environment,
and more. Id.
30. Clopton, supra note 6, at 290–92.
31. See id. at 292.
32. See id. at 290 & n.3.
33. See id. at 294–95. Note that, as Clopton explains, this may not be a
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included “citizen suits,” in which a private party sues to ensure
legal compliance and, sometimes, monetary damages—for example, suits to enforce voting rights, environmental or consumer
protections, or other “common public rights.”34 In a “grey area”
between these two extremes, Clopton placed all other “hybrids”
that provide injured parties with a private right of action running parallel to a government entity’s enforcement efforts under
the same statute—for example, private class actions alongside
government litigation in areas like antitrust, securities, housing,
and employment.35
Other scholars focus on the role of the “private attorney general,”36 where parties use their private rights of action to litigate
violations of public law. In early and influential scholarship,
John Coffee distinguished between two groups of private enforcers of public law—what he called the “ideological” and the “entrepreneurial” private attorneys general.37 Coffee’s ideologues
litigate mostly environmental, civil rights, and social justice
matters, often spearheaded by public interest legal organizations, making them accountable to those organizations’ supporters.38 The entrepreneurs, on the other hand—the “true
‘bounty hunter[s],’ motivated by . . . financial recovery . . . rather than . . . psychic income”—litigate mostly antitrust, securities, mass tort, and shareholder derivative cases.39 This, Coffee
argues, places them “beyond the control of the typically large and
amorphous class of clients . . . [they] represent.”40 Coffee’s analysis presented a cautionary tale focused on the potential harms

“purely” private actor given the government’s ability to intervene: “Private parties may litigate these cases themselves, or the government may intervene and
displace the private relator. Either way, the private party may share in the government’s recovery.” Id.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 295–98.
36. This term, coined by Appellate Court Judge Jerome Frank, first appeared in the 1943 case Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes,
134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), but did not become popularly used until the
1970s. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 215 n.1 (citing
Frank’s opinion that “[s]uch persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private
Attorney Generals”); Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2134–35.
37. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 235.
38. See id. at 235–36.
39. Id. at 235.
40. Id.
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of failing to restrain the entrepreneurial private attorney general. Yet, it also came with a prediction that financial pressures
on public interest attorneys and incentives in large class actions
may lead some ideological attorneys to “migrat[e]” toward entrepreneurialism.41
In another foundational work, William Rubenstein divided
private attorneys general into three camps: those who act as a
“substitute” for, as a “supplement” for, or as a “simulated” public
attorney general.42 Rubenstein’s “substitutes” include both
bounty hunter-style private attorneys and those brought in by a
public attorney general to litigate on the government’s behalf.43
His “supplements” include private cases that contribute to the
greater public interest—for example, environmental “citizen
suits” in which, by seeking redress for citizens’ own injuries, private class action attorneys also advance public policy.44 And Rubenstein’s “simulators” are attorneys acting for individual private clients whose behavior unintentionally benefits the public,
through, for example, establishing a fund that benefits many,
even if brought as an individual case.45
This Article’s proposal for public-private co-enforcement focuses on federal statutes that both authorize a government
agency to litigate violations and give citizens a private right of
action to sue for their own injuries arising out of the same harms.
As such, on Clopton’s continuum of all public and private overlap, it includes his “hybrid” category of private attorneys general
and some privately enforced “citizen suits” where clients suffer
their own injuries.46 But it excludes both privately enforced qui
tam suits of non-injured parties in place of the government and
publicly enforced parens patriae suits of state attorneys general
in place of individuals. It, therefore, focuses on what Coffee identifies as “ideological” private attorneys general (and not those
that are “entrepreneurial”),47 and on what Rubenstein identifies
as “supplemental” private attorneys general (and not those that
41. See id. at 236. This, he correctly feared, could cause judicial “dissatisfaction,” resulting in “judicial winnowing of class and derivative actions, as
courts impose more procedural and evidentiary hurdles on . . . plaintiff[s].” Id.
42. See Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2143–46.
43. See id. at 2145–46.
44. See id. at 2147–49.
45. See id.
46. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 294.
47. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text.
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are “substitutes” or “simulat[ors]”).48 While other areas of overlap may be ripe for coordination, this Article’s proposal of co-enforcement litigation is aimed solely at those “hybrid” claims in
which both private injured citizens and government enforcement
agencies might choose to litigate the same claims against the
same actors.
With this definition in mind, this Section turns now to the
theoretical foundations for hybrid schemes, focusing on rationales drawn from political and economic theory.
2. Political Theory Rationales
The history of the enactment of hybrid federal statutory regimes in U.S. law illustrates the political theory behind a parallel public-private enforcement approach. As Stephen Burbank
and his co-authors detail, federal statutes that encouraged private enforcement developed at several points throughout U.S.
history, but reach a highpoint in the late twentieth century.49
Between 1960 and 1980, two-and-a-half times as many such
statutes passed as had been passed in the nearly one hundred
years prior.50 Originally coined in a 1943 court decision related
to the New Deal, the term “private attorney general” did not gain
prominence until the 1970s when a series of new statutes made
attorneys’ fees available.51 “Once loosed as a matter of money,”
William Rubenstein notes, the spread of the private attorney
general concept “was limited only by the imagination of lawyers
seeking attorneys’ fees.”52
Scholars suggest several political rationales behind the rise
of statutes conferring private rights of action. First, allowing
both public and private actors to participate in law enforcement
48. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text; see also Burbank et al.,
supra note 1, at 661 (distinguishing between hybrid regimes that are “complementary” (which this Article includes) and those that are “substitutionary”
(which this Article does not include)).
49. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 644 (citing four points in history:
the post-Civil War Reconstruction Era, the Progressive era at the turn of the
century, the New Deal era after the Great Depression, and the Civil Rights era
of the 1960s).
50. See id. (observing that seventy statutes passed between 1960 and 1979
as compared with twenty-eight between 1887 and 1959).
51. See Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2134–35; see also Coffee, Rescuing the
Private AG, supra note 6, at 215.
52. See Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2136.
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may help resolve distrust of government. As Burbank et al. suggest, legal systems and enforcement mechanisms reflect the
preferences of those who create them, including key American
values like “self-reliance, belief in the virtues of free market capitalism, . . . and distrust of government.”53 Drawing on Robert
Kagan’s work on “adversarial legalism,” Burbank et al., identify
that political institutional structures—not some internal propensity toward litigiousness—helped spark hybrid enforcement
regimes.54 As they describe it, “[p]rivately-initiated litigation
satisfies the impulse in favor of decentralized regulation,” while
also reducing costs to the taxpayers who must foot the bill for
government enforcement.55
Second, the development of hybrid enforcement schemes reflects power struggles between the separate branches of U.S.
government. As extensively detailed by Sean Farhang and his
co-authors, fragmented enforcement of federal statutes reflects
concerns over which branch will maintain control over federal
law.56 In a political system of divided government, in which passing legislation is difficult and “the status quo [is] ‘sticky,’” Farhang et al. suggest that creating private enforcement instead of,
or in addition to, federal agency enforcement helps preserve the
enacting legislators’ preferences should party power in the legislature change.57 It also preserves their preferences against competing preferences from the executive branch, administrative
bureaucrats, or a politically appointed judiciary.58 Privatizing at
least some of the cost of new regulation may also help create
53. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 645.
54. See id. at 644–46 (citing ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM:
THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 9, 15–16, 34 (2001)).
55. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 645 (drawing on KAGAN, supra note
54).
56. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 6, at 3–4, 31–34; Burbank
et al., supra note 1, at 643, 646–48, 679, 691, 714; Burbank & Farhang, supra
note 6, at 1547–50; Sean Farhang, Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in
the American Separation of Powers System, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 821, 821–24
(2008); Sean Farhang & Miranda Yaver, Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 401 (2016).
57. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 6, at 3–4, 31–34; Burbank
et al., supra note 1, at 643, 646–48, 679, 691, 714; Farhang & Yaver, supra note
56, at 401–04, 415.
58. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 6, at 3–4, 31–34; Burbank
et al., supra note 1, at 643, 646–48, 679, 691, 714; Farhang & Yaver, supra note
56, at 401–04, 415.
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compromise needed to pass legislation in divided representative
government.59 For example, when enacting Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,60 Burbank et al. suggest the Democratic-controlled Congress “self-conscious[ly] mobiliz[ed] . . . private lawsuits at the expense of administrative power” due to both a “fear
of bureaucratic drift” and concerns over the cost of purely public
means of implementation.61
Third, allowing private individuals to pursue litigation on
behalf of the public serves democratic ideals by providing a forum for a range of public interests beyond the agency’s own
agenda.62 Myriam Gilles notes that, in hybrid schemes, private
lawsuits “represent a democratic, participatory mechanism that
affords concerned citizens a means to redress [public harms]”
and have a voice in government decisions.63 Involving more diverse participants in enforcement may also produce a greater
and more reliable body of information on violations of the law.64

59. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 679.
60. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e to e-17
(2012), is the main federal statute prohibiting race, sex, and other protectedclass discrimination in employment.
61. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 691–94; see also Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1547–50. To overcome Southern Democrats’ opposition to
the bill, Northern Democrats had to rely on moderate Republicans, who knew
they had to respond to the Civil Rights crisis, but feared “overzealous” enforcement by the Kennedy/Johnson executive branch. The result: “conservative Republicans stripped the EEOC of the strong administrative powers initially proposed by advocates of the job discrimination title, and provided instead for
private lawsuits with economic incentives for enforcement, including attorney
fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs.” Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 692. Ironically, when government enforcement weakened during the Reagan administration yet the judiciary sided increasingly with plaintiffs, civil rights advocates
changed their view to favor private litigation over government enforcement,
moving to amend the statute with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which “add[ed]
new monetary damages and jury trial provisions with the express goal of increasing private enforcement.” Id. at 693–94.
62. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 662 (“[R]elative to administrative
implementation, private enforcement regimes can . . . take advantage of private
information to detect violations [and] . . . facilitate participatory and democratic
governance.”); Farhang & Yaver, supra note 56, at 402–03; Gilles, Reinventing
Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1417–30.
63. See Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1420–21
(citing ENVTL. POLICY DIV. OF THE CONG. RESEARCH SERV. OF THE LIBRARY OF
CONG., 93D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 819 (Comm. Print 1973)).
64. See Farhang & Yaver, supra note 56, at 402–03 (noting that more par-
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Gilles describes this as a natural extension of the federal government seeking citizen help in law enforcement, “on the theory
that . . . the citizenry[’s] millions of ‘eyes on the ground’ see far
more than federal investigators ever could.”65
Yet despite their advantages from the perspective of political theory, overlapping enforcement schemes have also been subject to criticism due to their divided design. Where enforcement
is split among government and private enforcers, each may look
to the other creating a collective action problem that results in
“shirking,” with neither party taking ultimate control or responsibility.66 Because no one is in control, no one is accountable;
this, in turn, may exacerbate public skepticism of government.67
Having two separate enforcers with two separate enforcement mechanisms can also lead to confusion, contradiction, and
even dysfunction.68 As Zachary Clopton has demonstrated, overlapping enforcement structures may wreak havoc in terms of legal procedural doctrine.69 Agency and private litigation may occur simultaneously, with different aims and objectives; court
ticipants can “cultivate the creation and use of valuable information and expertise, productively leverage distinctive forms of institutional capacity, and foster
the representation of a wider range of groups and interests in the policymaking
process”); see also Clopton, supra note 6, at 310 (“Redundancy also permits ‘perspectival aggregation,’ as agents may offer a diversity of problem-solving approaches. . . . [P]ublic and private enforcers likely differ in their access to information, expertise, and perspectives.”).
65. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1429.
66. Clopton, supra note 6, at 311–12.
67. Farhang & Yaver, supra note 56, at 402, 404 (“Because fragmentation
weakens control over policymaking by elected officials, it erodes the democratic
accountability of policy makers.”); see also Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 667
(stating the argument that private enforcement “lack[s] democratic legitimacy
and accountability”).
68. Farhang & Yaver, supra note 56, at 402 (explaining the argument that
fragmentation “produces legal uncertainty, indeterminacy, and contradiction”);
see also Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 667 (describing the arguments that
“private enforcement regimes . . . produce inconsistent and contradictory doctrine from courts [and] weaken the administrative state’s capacity to articulate
a coherent regulatory scheme”). But see Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform,
supra note 6, at 1424–25 (suggesting that, in the context of police misconduct
litigation, a private-only enforcement scheme “would . . . tap the experiential
and financial resources of the citizenry, but in a manner that is [a] highly inefficient . . . patchwork of uncoordinated litigation efforts,” whereas a hybrid
“deputation model aligns public and private interests in a fashion that encourages coordinated litigation strategies aimed at developing national standards”).
69. Clopton, supra note 6, at 328–29 (“Simultaneous suits risk duplicative
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decisions and interpretations may contradict one another.70 Simultaneous, separate litigation may create confusion over the preclusive effect of judgments by alternative enforcers.71 This is a
complex, context-specific problem for each hybrid enforcement
scheme given that, as Clopton notes, “there is no universal template for rules on preclusion, damages, and claims processing
that modulate public-private enforcement.”72
Thus, while statutes that create divided enforcement authority reflect American political norms73 and an intentional design choice to balance power in the face of uncertain control,74
they bring with them the attendant risks of conflict, confusion,
and inertia.
3. Economic Theory Rationales
A separate, but related group of considerations for hybrid
enforcement grows out of economic theory. The chief economic
argument in favor of hybrid enforcement systems is that they
increase overall enforcement of the law while also shifting the
cost of the increase away from the public fisc.75 In his germinal
work on the private attorney general, John Coffee describes this
advantage, noting that “the role of private litigation is not simply
to secure compensation for victims, but is at least equally to generate deterrence . . . by multiplying the total resources committed to the detection and prosecution of . . . prohibited behavior.”76
work and lose out on beneficial aggregation. [They] also risk shirking, as both
agents will prefer that the other makes costly investments in research. [And] if
simultaneous litigation creates a race, it may discourage enforcers from sharing
information, while encouraging them to cut corners, strike sweetheart deals, or
engage in inefficient gamesmanship.”); id. at 299–306, 325–26, 328–29 (discussing further procedural challenges of overlapping regimes).
70. See id. at 299–306, 328–29.
71. See id. at 299–306, 325–26, 328–29.
72. Id. at 292.
73. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 645–46 (citing KAGAN, supra note
54).
74. See id. at 647–48, 713–14. As Farhang and Yaver explain, from the perspective of the executive branch, administrative structures may have become
“more and more cumbersome, unwieldy, and hard to manage” because “[t]hey
were, in part, intended to be so,” designed by “Congresses wishing to check subversion of legislative preferences by hostile executives.” Farhang & Yaver, supra
note 56, at 415.
75. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 218–25.
76. Id. at 218.
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Enabling private enforcers to litigate was intended as a “necessary supplement” to public agency enforcement:77 as Coffee explains, the “private attorney general is induced by the profit motive to seek out cases that otherwise might go undetected.”78 A
hybrid system that incentivizes private attorneys to pay up front
for the cost of litigation with the promise of attorneys’ fees or a
bounty reward provides added enforcement with no cost to cashstrapped public agencies.79 Indeed, as Gilles suggests, reliance
on private enforcement to supplement public agency budgets is
now both assumed and expected.80
A second economic rationale for hybrid enforcement is that
it fosters healthy competition that can lead to innovation and
ensure robust enforcement.81 Public and private enforcers competing for fines or damages may work harder and faster to beat
each other to the punch in filing, and succeeding in, litigation.82
The fact that Congress has created a private right of action to
encourage enforcement of any particular statute also sends a
message—as Burbank et al. describe it, a “clear and consistent
signal that violations will be prosecuted,” which “insur[es]
against the risk that a system of administrative implementation
will be subverted.”83 Clopton adds that redundant authority to
77. Id. (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
78. Id. at 220.
79. See COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 219
(“[P]rivate enforcement of law through entrepreneurial litigation does litigate
complex cases well (probably better than more resource-constrained public enforcers can do).”); Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 662 (noting arguments that
“private enforcement regimes can . . . multiply resources devoted to prosecuting
enforcement actions [and] shift the costs of regulation off of governmental budgets and onto the private sector”); Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2149–50 (describing the view of “private attorneys general [as] a necessary supplement to government enforcement” given that “public attorneys may be fewer in number,
underfunded, less skilled, or prone to political pressures”).
80. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 626 (noting that “[p]rivate involvement in public civil law enforcement is [so] deeply embedded in our
politics and culture” that many agencies “are funded and organized on the clear,
if largely unspoken, understanding that a vigorous and well-stocked private bar
sits ready to deploy its ample resources to redress frauds and other harms perpetrated upon the general public”).
81. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 662 (“[P]rivate enforcement regimes
can . . . encourage legal and policy innovation.”); Clopton, supra note 6, at 308–
11; Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2149–50.
82. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 308–11.
83. Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 662.
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enforce public law prevents under-enforcement because having
two parallel enforcers ensures that either will make up for the
other’s preferences or errors in selecting and prosecuting cases.84
Yet, as with political rationales, the same economic rationales that support hybrid enforcement also spark criticism. Hybridity compounds total resources spent on enforcement without
additional public cost, but it may also lead to inefficient duplication.85 As Clopton describes, a robust literature supports procedural “maximalism” opposed to redundancies across civil procedure, including in the context of public law enforcement.86
Hybrid enforcement schemes may effectively protect against under-enforcement, but they also risk the opposite consequence of
over-enforcement and “multiple punishments” against the same
actors for the same behavior.87 Coffee suggests that economists’
concerns that hybrid enforcement leads to broad, “excess deterrence” may be overstated.88 But while private lawsuits may not
“broaden the scope” of enforcement, he notes, they may “intensif[y] the penalty” instead.89

84. Clopton, supra note 6, at 290, 308–11 (“Redundant public-private authority should mean that fewer good cases are missed . . . . [R]edundant litigation may cure existing under-enforcement and deter future under-enforcement
by allowing a second agent to fill the remedial gap . . . .”).
85. See id. at 288–90 (describing economic arguments against duplication);
Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 221 n.15 (describing further
arguments).
86. Clopton, supra note 6, at 288 (“[T]he mere mention of duplication is met
with resistance across a range of procedural contexts.”); id. at 288–89 (“Modern
civil procedure evinces a ‘maximalist’ preference against redundancy.”); id. at
288 n.12 (citing and collecting studies).
87. Id. at 290 (describing that, while redundancy prevents under-enforcement, “redundant litigation [also] risks over-enforcement in the form of multiple
punishments”); see Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 220–21,
220 n.14.
88. Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 220–25 (citing “available empirical evidence,” which he acknowledges may be imperfect and incomplete, that follow-on private securities and antitrust cases filed after public enforcement actions did not significantly increase “the probability of detection”);
see Gilles & Friedman, Exploding the Myth, supra note 6, at 155–59 (raising
doubts that class-action lawsuits overdeter efficient behavior).
89. Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 223; see Rubenstein,
supra note 6, at 2151 (“The only supplemental function performed by this private attorney general is that of multiplying wrongdoers’ penalties: she provides
no independent search skills, no special litigation savvy, and no nonpoliticized
incentives. She simply piles on and runs up the tab.”). Coffee acknowledges,
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Another, and the most robust, economic criticism of hybrid
enforcement is what Coffee and other law and economics scholars refer to as the “agency costs” caused by the disconnect between the financial interests of plaintiffs’ attorneys and the public interests of the clients they represent.90 Because each plaintiff
in a large securities, consumer, or antitrust class action will have
a very small individual recovery, the class members may not be
interested enough to exert control over the plaintiffs’ attorneys.91
So unchecked, an opportunistic plaintiffs’ attorney becomes a
“rent-seeking entrepreneur” who may settle the case in a way
that meets the attorney’s own financial interest, leaving individual plaintiffs under-compensated.92 Gilles has challenged the
“agency costs” theory for its focus on individual class member
compensation as the goal of private enforcement of public law

however, that there may still be “social utility” in deep, rather than broad, enforcement. Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 224–25 (“‘[F]ree
riding’ by the private plaintiff on governmental enforcement efforts is by no
means without social utility: . . . it does escalate the penalty structure . . . [and]
may be more efficient for public agencies to concentrate on detection . . . and
leave the actual litigation of the case to private enforcers, who are frequently
more experienced in litigation tactics.”).
90. Gilles, Can Coffee Rescue?, supra note 6, at 1002–04 (citing and describing COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 117, 219); see Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 218–19; Rubenstein, supra note
6, at 2140, 2161–65 (“Professor Coffee specifically, and law and economics scholars more generally, proposed rules that sought to reduce agency costs by ‘better
align[ing] the interests of the plaintiff’s attorney’ with those of the class members she represented. So convincing was this solution that it became a virtual
mantra of the class action literature in the 1990s . . . . ”). See generally Samuel
Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3165, 3183–85 (2013), for a discussion of agency costs in class actions outside of the “securities and corporate governance” context.
91. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
884 (1987); Gilles, Can Coffee Rescue?, supra note 6, at 1003 (citing COFFEE,
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 117, 219) (“[P]rivate enforcement is ‘persistently misdirected’ by ‘fiduciary failure’—the structurally misaligned incentives that lead ‘plaintiff’s attorneys to settle cases in their own interest.’ . . . [A] corresponding detriment is that the named plaintiffs’ interests
are too small to warrant any substantial investment in monitoring the lawyers.”); Gilles & Friedman, Exploding the Myth, supra note 6, at 113–16 (describing scholarly arguments regarding plaintiff incentives their article seeks
to debunk).
92. Gilles & Friedman, Exploding the Myth, supra note 6, at 113–16.
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rather than whether a class action lawsuit “causes the defendant-wrongdoer to internalize the social costs of its actions.”93 Yet
she, too, acknowledges the possibility of a problematic disconnect
between class action attorneys and the class members they represent, a “tyranny paradox” inherent in litigation as an enforcement mechanism whereby a class action attorney’s settlement
that benefits some or all class members also precludes the ability
of others to sue for their own “better or different relief.”94
Thus, while hybrid systems allowing both public and private
enforcement offer a way to increase and ensure robust enforcement without adding public costs, they bring with them attendant risks of duplication, excessive penalties, and straying
from serving public goals through private litigation.
B. PUBLIC-PRIVATE CO-ENFORCEMENT THEORY
Having articulated the theoretical foundations for, and criticisms of, hybrid public-private enforcement of federal public
law, this Section applies them to a proposal of public-private coenforcement. What is lost—or gained—when applying the same
political and economic rationales that support separate, parallel
enforcement mechanisms instead to public and private enforcers
litigating collaboratively on the same matters together? This
Section argues that, while not a panacea, co-enforcement offers
the promise of both maintaining the theory-based benefits of hybrid enforcement and overcoming some of its challenges. It first
defines this Article’s proposal of “public-private co-enforcement”
litigation. It then analyzes how integrating currently parallel
public and private enforcement tracks would impact the political
and economic theories that supported the development of existing hybrid systems.
93. Id. at 104–05 (“[T]he so-called ‘agency cost’ problem is mostly a mirage.
So far as the vast majority of small-claims class actions go, concerns with the
undercompensation of absent class members are totally misplaced . . . . All that
matters is whether the practice causes the defendant-wrongdoer to internalize
the social costs of its actions. Once this normative polestar is accepted, much of
the recent literature on [agency costs in] class actions comes up for reexamination.”).
94. Gilles, Can Coffee Rescue?, supra note 6, at 1008. Gilles describes this
concern as a “‘who the heck are you’ critique aimed at the class action lawyer’s
self-appointed assumption of power.” Id. In the end, however, she perceives that
this is not a uniquely private enforcer “interloper” problem, but rather a challenge of litigation as enforcement as compared to legislation. See id. at 1030–
38.
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1. Defining “Public-Private Co-Enforcement”
To apply the theoretical foundations underlying hybrid enforcement to a new concept requires first defining the proposed
concept. A “public-private co-enforcement” scheme as envisioned
by this Article means both federal agency attorneys and private
plaintiffs’ attorneys working in collaboration on litigation
against the same violator for the same harms as, in effect, cocounsel. Co-enforcement would not usurp the independence of
either public agency or private attorney enforcers, as nothing
would require the parties to collaborate, or to refrain from separately pursuing an enforcement action, unless they agree to do
so. The goal would be to develop mechanisms for coordinated litigation, particularly on complex or significant cases against important actors, for which combined resources could have the
most deterrent impact on other potential violators. This integrated approach draws on insights from other scholars who have
studied collaborative enforcement95 and who have raised proposals for improving existing hybrid systems.96 Yet it differs
from most other proposals in that it does not seek to vest overarching enforcement authority in one enforcer or the other, instead arguing for a co-equal approach.
The term “co-enforcement” was coined by political scientist
and labor scholar Janice Fine and her colleagues to describe collaboration by workers’ organizations and government agencies
tasked with enforcing labor laws.97 Fine’s work draws on insights from theories of “coproduction” of public services by both

95. See supra note 6.
96. See infra notes 107–19 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Matthew Amengual & Janice Fine, Co-Enforcing Labor Standards: Unique Contributions of State and Worker Organizations in Argentina and
the United States, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 129, 129 (2017) (defining co-enforcement as the “on-going, coordinated efforts of state regulators and worker organizations to jointly produce labor standards enforcement”); Fine, Enforcing Labor
Standards, supra note 20, at 361–63 (“Co-enforcement conceptualizes state capacity for enforcement as a process of negotiated interdependence between regulators and societal organizations.”); Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement Through Partnership with Workers’
Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 553 (2010) (calling for “workers’ organizations as well as firms to partner with the government to detect violators”); see
also Fine, New Approaches, supra note 20, 146 n.13 (explaining that co-enforcement was “developed by Amengual and Fine” and “draws heavily upon Fine &
Gordon”); Patel & Fisk, supra note 20, at 3–4 (explaining Fine and her collabo-
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state and citizen,98 “collaborative governance” between state
agencies and stakeholder groups,99 and “republican tripartism”
to involve public interest groups in regulatory governance.100
Fine proposes that, by engaging with workers’ centers and key
nonprofit organizations, government agencies can overcome limited resources and worker distrust to ensure more effective enforcement of health and safety and wage and hour laws.101 She
conducted several empirical studies of “emerging models of coenforcement,” including partnerships between organizations
that serve vulnerable workers and government agencies responsible for enforcing labor laws in Austin, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco.102 Among the conclusions Fine drew from her studies
is that co-enforcement efforts were most successful when the
agencies and organizations “recognized each other’s unique capacities” and did not “attempt to substitute for one another,” and
when “both ced[ed] some control . . . to collaborate.”103 Fine also

rator’s research and documenting an example of co-enforcement in San Francisco).
98. See, e.g., Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 362 (citing
Elinor Ostrom, Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Development, 24 WORLD DEV. 1073 (1993); Anuradha Joshi & Mick Moore, Institutionalized Coproduction: Unorthodox Public Service Delivery in Challenging Environments, 40 J. DEV. STUD., May 2006, at 32 (2004)); Fine, New Approaches,
supra note 20, at 147–48 (same).
99. See, e.g., Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 363 (citing
Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice,
18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 543 (2008)); Fine, New Approaches, supra
note 20, at 149 (same).
100. See, e.g., Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 362 (citing
Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment, 16 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 435 (1991)); Fine, New Approaches, supra note 20,
at 148–49 (citing IAN AYRES & JOHN BRATHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 54–100 (1992)).
101. Fine, New Approaches, supra note 20, at 145–49; see Fine, Enforcing
Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 361–65.
102. Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 362, 367–82 (including a co-enforcement partnership with the federal Occupational Health and
Safety Administration); see also Fine, New Approaches, supra note 20, at 158–
71 (describing further studies including in Palmyra, Pennsylvania).
103. Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 362; see also Fine,
New Approaches, supra note 20, at 149–54. In addition, Fine noted that “[t]rust,
adaptation, accountability and communication” between co-enforcers were key.
Id. at 155.
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noted that political support for collaborative enforcement was essential.104
Fine’s model for labor standards co-enforcement is unique to
its own context, and it places workers themselves, not just their
representatives, in the center of the process.105 Thus it is not directly applicable to a context focusing solely on attorneys’ actions.106 Yet Fine’s work provides a helpful analogy—a way to
conceptualize government and private actors, both of whom seek
to enforce the same laws, working together. This Article proposes
a version of “co-enforcement” for public law litigators: a merging
of enforcement efforts between public agency attorneys and private plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking to enforce the same public civil
laws.
This Article also builds upon a separate line of scholarship
that has focused on strengthening existing hybrid enforcement
by placing greater or overarching authority on the public half of
the hybrid enforcement scheme. Several scholars have considered bringing private attorneys under the direction of public
agencies, either to increase public agency capacity or to curb
profit-motivated plaintiffs’ attorneys straying from their public
purpose, or both.107 In an early work, Myriam Gilles proposed
creating a “public-private partnership” to supplement limited
public capacity to pursue constitutional claims by “deputizing”
private citizens to litigate police misconduct cases.108 Gilles proposed authorizing the Attorney General to create an agency relationship between the executive branch and victims of unconstitutional policing in a “classic deputation scheme” that would
104. Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 363, 367, 379–80;
see also Fine, New Approaches, supra note 20, at 156–58.
105. Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 365–66 (“Agency
leaders . . . must . . . believe that the full potential for enforcement cannot be
achieved without including workers . . . and that doing so does not compromise
their role.”).
106. However, public interest law centers, like Bet Tzedek Legal Services,
played a role in some labor co-enforcement models Fine studied, id. at 373. And
Fine observed that co-enforcement efforts with the California Department of
Labor Standards Enforcement increased after the former leader of the Asian
American Legal Defense Fund, Julie Su, was appointed to head the state
agency, id. at 374–76; see also Patel & Fisk, supra note 20, at 17–18.
107. See Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2163–64.
108. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1387–88 (proposing a new private right of action in an area of law that currently lacks a
hybrid enforcement scheme).
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vest in the federal government the ultimate “power to quash”
any related private lawsuit “at any stage.”109
Others have proposed a greater screening role for public
agencies or public supervision of “entrepreneurial” private attorneys general to reduce the problem of “agency costs” in private
enforcement.110 David Freeman Engstrom has examined the
“gatekeeping” role that public agencies play in allowing private
attorneys to pursue enforcement litigation, suggesting stronger
oversight with some coordination of private litigation by the public agency.111 More expansively, John Coffee has proposed creating a “semi-private attorney general” in which the public agency
more directly oversees private class action enforcement, yet
without absolute veto power.112 This would allow public enforcers to “harness” the “entrepreneurial energy of the plaintiff’s
bar” to maximize enforcement capacity, while resolving the
agency costs problem of profit-motivated private attorneys who

109. Id. at 1387–88, 1417.
110. For arguments in favor of expanded public agency oversight, see, for
example, COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6; Engstrom,
Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, supra note 6; Stephenson, supra note 6. Alternatively, Adam Zimmerman and Margaret Lemos have suggested that public
entities should, in their own enforcement efforts, consider adopting procedural
protections required of private class action attorneys to better protect and serve
individual public interests. Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486
(2012) [hereinafter Lemos, Aggregate Litigation] (addressing the lack of procedural rules guiding state attorney general aggregate suits); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011) (suggesting that, when
compensating victims, agencies should adopt procedures similar to those guiding private class actions); see also Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, ForProfit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853 (2014) (discussing the impact
of financial incentives on public enforcement litigators); Adam S. Zimmerman
& Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1992, 1992 (2012) (proposing that agencies adopt “aggregation procedures” for
common claims to “promote more efficiency, consistency, and legal access”).
111. Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, supra note 6, at 695–712;
see also David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:
Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False
Claims Act, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1689 (2013) (offering further analysis on how
the gatekeeper theory works in practice).
112. COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 195, 219–35;
see Gilles, Can Coffee Rescue?, supra note 6, at 1038.
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are not accountable to any particular client.113 Seeking to “rehabilitate” the concept of the private attorney general, Coffee suggests “an alliance under which the ‘gatekeeper’ agency retains
the private firm . . . on a contingent fee basis” to conduct work
on behalf—and under the supervision—of the public agency.114
On the other hand, scholars have suggested that public enforcers expand their own role or take on additional enforcement
tasks to make up for constraints placed on private enforcement
by over a decade of “litigation reform.”115 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence limiting class actions, Gilles and
Gary Friedman proposed that state governments use their
parens patriae role to step in on behalf of citizen suits traditionally brought by private plaintiffs’ attorneys.116 States could “represent the interests of their citizens in the very consumer, antitrust, wage-and-hour, and other . . . staple[s] of class action
practice” no longer readily available to private attorneys due to
judicial hostility toward class certification and a rise in mandatory arbitration.117 Still others have simply called for federal
agencies to increase their proportion of systemic class-style enforcement actions to fill the gaps left by restrictions on private
class actions.118
While each of these proposals aims to make use of hybrid
mechanisms to improve enforcement outcomes, all require the
public enforcer to take on an increased or supervisorial position
as principals over private plaintiff’s attorneys willing to be made
113. COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 174–75, 195,
219–35; see also Gilles, Can Coffee Rescue?, supra note 6, at 1038.
114. COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 227–28.
115. See infra Part II.A.3 (describing “litigation reform” efforts and their impact on private plaintiff’s attorneys’ enforcement lawsuits).
116. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 630–31, 668–72.
117. Id. Again, the additional work could then be contracted out to those
private attorneys in a principal-agent relationship, with robust supervision and
control by AGs over the lawsuits. See id. at 630 (“The active presence of a responsible elected official here, as both cocounsel and client, vanquishes the
agency critique in our view. . . . Watchful supervisory control over the litigation
will be critical.”).
118. See, e.g., Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing Out Pattern or Practice After
Wal-Mart: The EEOC as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87 (2013) (calling for greater
systemic enforcement of Title VII by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the wake of precedent limiting class certification); Joseph A. Seiner,
Weathering Wal-Mart, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (2014) (advancing a similar argument).
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their agents.119 This Article’s proposal of public-private co-enforcement seeks to redress similar concerns of prior scholars, yet
does so in a novel way that recognizes both the mounting limitations on public agency enforcers and the expertise and independence of private attorney enforcers. Like Gilles and Friedman’s,
this proposal seeks to ensure access to the courts for harmed individuals in the wake of case law limiting class actions and expanding arbitration, and it measures enforcement success in deterrent impact.120 And like others, this proposal seeks to harness
the financial resources of the private bar to bolster increased demand on government agency recourses.121 Yet, while Coffee’s
proposal focuses on correcting the excesses and problems of “entrepreneurial” private attorneys general, this Article’s approach
focuses on both empowering the “ideological” private attorneys
general and on protecting government agencies under deregulatory attack.122
Moreover, prior approaches focus on greater public agency
control over private attorneys to whom the work is delegated or
outsourced. Instead, this Article envisions co-equal, co-counselstyle collaboration rather than a principal-agent relationship—
an equal partnership between public and private enforcers seeking redress for the same important harms. So constructed, a public-private co-enforcement scheme stands to maintain the benefits of a hybrid system, while resolving some of its theory-based
challenges.
2. Political Theory Rationales
Returning to the political theories that supported hybrid enforcement design, a co-enforcement model may, in fact, better
serve the rationales of keeping bureaucracy in check, balancing
power in divided government, and ensuring democratic participation.123 If private individuals are distrustful of government
agencies, having a co-equal private partner may allow a more

119.
120.
121.
122.
II.B.1.
123.

See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 630–31, 668–72.
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.C.
See Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 235; infra Part
See supra Part I.A.2.
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direct watchdog that ensures agency accountability to the public.124 If legislators are concerned that executive agencies will
thwart their political power,125 the legislators’ constituents
would actively participate in a co-equal co-enforcement scheme.
And if the underlying goal of a divided enforcement system is to
make sure that no one party has too much political power,126 a
co-enforcement partnership requires public and private enforcers to work together, which will necessitate compromise and balance.
A collaborative system would also enhance the goal of participatory, representative enforcement127 because it would require agencies to listen to their private enforcement partners’
perspectives. Moreover, instead of sharing information on litigation efforts by “signal” only—where one enforcer infers information from the other’s independent actions128—enforcers would
share and pool information directly, in real time, to enhance collective enforcement efforts.129
More importantly, a co-enforcement approach may avoid the
political theory-based criticisms of hybrid systems by improving
upon parallel, but redundant enforcement. If critics of redundant
enforcement are concerned about a collective action problem or
shirking,130 co-enforcement requires internal and automatic accountability. Neither party can shirk without express knowledge
by the other, who will then be motivated to hold the shirker responsible.131
If divided enforcement can lead to contradictory approaches
or bureaucratic dysfunction,132 for the portion of cases pursued
through co-enforcement, both enforcers will have to agree on a
124. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
128. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 312 (citing and discussing literature on
information “signaling”).
129. Cf. id. (“[S]ometimes the relevant data will be complements, e.g., two
pieces of information gain additional value when put together. In this circumstance, the incentive to gather each piece of information is increased rather than
decreased.”).
130. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
131. Cf. Clopton, supra note 6, at 311–12, 311 n.171 (“Shirking also is reduced if agents explicitly or implicitly coordinated, dividing the information
space between them.”).
132. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
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unified approach to the case. Any disagreements between coequal co-counsel that will, no doubt, arise, will have to be worked
out and overcome within the context of each case.
A co-enforcement approach will also resolve any confusion
about preclusion, multiple punishments, and other procedural
challenges in parallel redundant litigation.133 Instead of separate cases being pursued simultaneously in a race to the courthouse, both public and private enforcers will coordinate in ways
that clearly establish and account for problems raised by possible future preclusion.
3. Economic Theory Rationales
Likewise, an integrated co-enforcement approach may
equally serve economic rationales supporting parallel hybrid enforcement. If the primary economic benefit of redundant private
enforcement is that it multiplies total resources on enforcement
of public laws without requiring additional public funding,134 coenforcement should not change that equation. As described in
Part III, private enforcers will still foot the bill for their own additional enforcement and seek reimbursement through contingent and attorneys’ fees.135 On the other hand, if enforcers are
pursuing the same violators together, this could reduce the
breadth of coverage provided by supplementing public with private resources.136 Even so, that may not be a true loss. As John
Coffee suggested, private resources do not necessarily produce
greater breadth in detecting additional violators, but, instead,
greater depth in “intensity” of penalties.137 Given that, as described in Part II, each half of the hybrid enforcement equation
has less force now than it did two decades ago,138 combining efforts may make better use of existing limited resources. One intense, successful penalty from combined enforcement may be
equally or more efficient deterrence than broader, shallow, or
unsuccessful enforcement.

133. See supra notes 30, 69–72 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 75–84 and accompanying text.
135. See infra Part III.B.
136. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text; see also Coffee, Rescuing
the Private AG, supra note 6, at 220–25; Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2140.
138. See infra Part II.
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A co-enforcement approach may also serve the economic goal
of creating competition to foster innovation in enforcement just
as well as a hybrid approach.139 While the competition would be
removed for the portion of cases that are pursued collaboratively,
the new approach would, itself, be innovative and likely spark
new policy directions beyond any one piece of litigation. And because co-enforcement would not replace all parallel, hybrid enforcement, competition would still exist for the portion of cases
each enforcer pursues independently.
A co-enforcement scheme may, however, be less effective
than a hybrid “redundant” system’s ability at preventing underenforcement.140 At least for the portion of cases pursued collaboratively, enforcers would lose the advantage of each half of a parallel hybrid enforcement scheme filling in where the other made
errors or biased decisions in case selection or approach.141 Yet,
again, what is lost in breadth of case selection may be counterbalanced by depth in prosecution—better, more effective, enforcement for those cases selected. Collaboration signals to defendant-violators that if their case is selected by a coenforcement team, they are more likely to lose. Thus a decrease
in the probability that any one violator will be targeted may be
offset by an increase in the probability that, once targeted, a violator will be more likely to lose against more effective, combined
enforcement.
Moreover, a co-enforcement approach may better overcome
economic arguments against hybridity. Among the strongest economic criticisms of hybrid public-private enforcement is that it
is anti-maximalist, inefficiently duplicative, and may lead to
over-enforcement.142 For the portion of “redundant” enforcement
that is made collaborative, these concerns would be entirely resolved.143 Rather than duplicating efforts, the two enforcers
would combine them, resulting in one prosecution and punishment drawing equally on half of each set of resources.

139. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text; Clopton, supra note 6,
at 318–24.
140. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
141. See id.
142. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 308–09 (describing criticism); supra notes
85–89 and accompanying text.
143. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 328–31; supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
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Most importantly, co-enforcement stands to dramatically reduce agency costs144 in ways contemplated by previous scholarly
proposals,145 yet with important additional advantages: maintaining shared resources and valuing the independent authority
of private enforcers. Rather than pulling private attorneys general entirely under the authority of public enforcers to curb their
“rent-seeking” instincts,146 a collaborative partnership may
achieve a similar end while also recognizing the autonomy and
added value of “ideological” private attorneys general.147 Private
class action attorneys, many of whom are sophisticated, successful, and effective advocates for private citizens, are not likely to
jump at the chance to work under the thumb of a public agency
and its limited resources and heavy bureaucracy.
While decades of law and economics scholarship has painted
class action attorneys as clientless opportunists, a more recent
and emerging literature by scholars including Adam Zimmerman and Margaret Lemos148 has questioned the effectiveness of
public entities in redressing private individuals’ harms after a
large public enforcement suit. For example, Zimmerman has
suggested that public agencies should adopt some of the procedural protections of private class actions to ensure fairness to
the public in large-scale enforcement actions.149 Indeed, as Clopton has documented, there are scholarly arguments critiquing
private enforcement’s greedy excesses, and there are equally
strong arguments critiquing public enforcement’s bureaucratic
ineffectiveness.150
Rather than making one enforcer the dominant principal
over the other, a co-equal collaborative design combines the benefits of both halves of the enforcement equation, with each
providing a check on the other’s limitations, in a manner that

144. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 107–17 and accompanying text (describing proposals
by Gilles, Engstrom, Rubenstein, and Coffee).
146. See supra notes 10–11, 39–40, 92 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
148. See generally Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 110; Lemos &
Minzner, supra note 110; Zimmerman, supra note 110; Zimmerman & Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 110.
149. See Zimmerman, supra note 110, at 556–72; see also Zimmerman &
Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 110, at 2035–67.
150. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 288–89.
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respects the talents and autonomy of each. So designed, a co-enforcement approach stands to serve many of the political and
economic rationales that sparked hybrid enforcement design,
while overcoming some of hybrid schemes’ shortcomings.
C. CHALLENGES FOR THE THEORETICAL BASIS
The political and economic theories supporting hybrid enforcement may support a move to co-enforcement, but a collaborative approach is not without its own challenges. This Section
considers theory-based counterarguments to public-private coenforcement, including that enforcers have differing roles and
goals, the perception of agency bias, and the risk of removing
useful redundancy.
The most immediate challenge to co-enforcement design is
that public and private enforcers come from two different perspectives with differing roles and goals. Scholarship on hybrid
systems regularly acknowledge that “public and private enforcers possess different preferences and interests.”151 Private plaintiffs’ attorneys are presumed to be focused on collecting attorneys’ fees or bounty rewards, with a fear of preclusion that may
encourage settlement at the expense of the public interest.152
Meanwhile, public agency attorneys are presumed to be focused
on injunctive relief, motivated by making systemic change.153
The “conventional story” assumes that enforcers’ primary objectives point in opposite directions of compensation and deterrence, with private attorneys looking backward to individual
damages and public attorneys looking forward to deterring future harm.154
Yet, as William Rubenstein suggests, this is an oversimplification;155 although public and private enforcers’ interests may
not be perfectly aligned, there is significant overlap. Privately
obtained damages (especially if punitive) spark deterrence, and
publicly obtained fines and fees often compensate past injuries,
such that, “in reality, both public and private lawyers pursue
both deterrence and compensation.”156 Where Congress enacted
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See id. at 308 nn.149 & 152 (discussing and citing scholarship).
See id. at 321.
See id. at 326.
See Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2140.
See id. at 2140–42.
See id.
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statutes creating both federal agency enforcement and empowering private attorneys general, the intent was to maximize enforcement of the same statutory rights.157 So while the motivations for pursuing actions may be slightly different, the goal of
the effort to enforce is the same. Co-enforcement teams could focus on this shared overlap. To the extent the teams would have
competing goals, they will have to compromise to succeed, which
may benefit the public by enhancing ultimate penalties and reimbursement of enforcement costs. Public enforcers will ensure
that private enforcers do not settle in ways that “sell out” the
class; private enforcers will ensure that injunctive relief efforts
are reimbursed and compensated for through attorneys’ or contingent fees.
A second counterargument against integrating public and
private enforcement is the concern that the public enforcers
could be susceptible to capture by private parties, or could show
bias toward plaintiffs over defendants.158 In the traditional concept of capture, government regulations or the way in which they
are applied are “directed away from the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and
action of the industry itself.”159 For example, a public agency
might be impacted by the “influence of repeated interaction with
the regulated industry” or by “campaign contributions, pressure
on politicians, and . . . the ‘revolving door’” of specialized employees between industry and agency.160
Given that the coordination in a co-enforcement litigation
scheme would include regulators and private attorneys, both of
whom seek to enforce regulations against industry, traditional
capture concerns are not implicated. Those regulated may, however, raise a valid concern about the perception of bias or favoritism toward plaintiffs’ attorneys with whom the agency works
157. See supra notes 1–3, 49–52, 75–80 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 672–74.
159. See Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1,
13 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014).
160. See Carpenter & Moss, supra note 159, at 18–20. A discussion of regulatory capture is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the role
public interest organizations may play in mitigating regulatory capture, see
AYRES & BRATHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE, supra note 100; Ayres & Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory
Capture and Empowerment, supra note 100.
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or who make political contributions that benefit the agency. Yet
this issue should be less of a concern in a collaborative enforcement scheme than in the deputization schemes others have proposed in which public agencies outsource work to private plaintiff’s attorneys.161 Although federal public agency litigators
could, technically, be helped by campaign contributions to the
President who appointed and hired them, this influence is remote.162 As described in Part III in a co-equal collaborative enforcement scheme, the plaintiffs’ attorneys would not be contracted or paid by the federal agency; instead they would be
reimbursed, as usual, from their own attorneys’ or contingency
fees, for their portion of the co-counseling that occurred. To the
extent that an agency would be perceived as too pro-plaintiff,
that perception would likely be no different for any agency that
litigates to enforce the law against defendant violators, regardless of the presence of private co-counsel.163
A final counterargument to co-enforcement is that it may be
too maximalist. Efficiency and reducing duplication of efforts
and multiple punishments may be a laudable goal,164 but, as
Zachary Clopton argues, fragmented authority and redundant

161. See supra notes 107–17 and accompanying text. For example, Gilles and
Friedman raised similar concerns in their proposal that state attorneys general
hire private attorneys to work on their increased parens patriae suits, citing
criticisms raised when “state AGs hired well-known plaintiffs’ lawyers to
sue . . . cigarette manufacturers.” See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra
note 6, at 672. Gilles cautioned that “AGs should expect zero tolerance for ‘pay
to play’ regimes in which campaign contributions are, or appear to be, reciprocated by contingent fee engagements.” Id. at 674.
162. And certainly far more remote than that of a financial contribution to
the re-election campaign of the state attorney general litigating alongside private attorneys. See supra note 161.
163. See, e.g., Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 381 (quoting Julie Su, the head of the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, on “government neutrality”: “[W]e are not a neutral agency. We are on
the side of the law . . . . We need to always act fairly but if you break the law,
you are going to view our enforcement as biased.”).
164. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 288–89 (citing maximalists); supra notes
85–87, 142–43 and accompanying text.
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enforcement may be a feature, rather than a bug, of federal statutory design.165 Redundancy helps ensure proper levels of enforcement, and courts already have procedural mechanisms for
resolving problems of overlap.166
Co-enforcement need not—and likely would not—become
the norm, however. Enforcers would not get rid of parallel enforcement entirely, they would just consider collaboration whenever and wherever possible and preferred. This may strike a balance between duplication that is actually useful and duplication
that is merely redundant.
***
As this Part has shown, the same political and economic theories that sparked the development of parallel hybrid enforcement schemes would likely also support a move to public-private
co-enforcement. Co-enforcement may help resolve distrust of
government, preserve legislative over solely executive preferences, ensure democratic participation, and use limited public
enforcement resources effectively. Moreover, integrated co-enforcement can resolve some of the criticisms of parallel hybrid
enforcement design by reducing contradiction and shirking in
the enforcement process and duplication and agency costs in litigation. Still, if moving from parallel hybrid to integrated publicprivate co-enforcement may make sense as a matter of theory,
that does not justify changing the status quo. For that, this Article turns to necessity, arguing that current capacity to secure
enforcement of key public laws is on a path to a dangerous low
point.
II. NORMATIVE CASE FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE
CO-ENFORCEMENT
For over a decade, “litigation reform”167 efforts and related
Supreme Court jurisprudence have limited class action practice,
intensified federal pleading standards, and compelled ever-more
165. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 6, at 3–4, 31–34; Clopton,
supra note 6, at 290 (explaining that spreading authority “across diverse agents
may respond to errors, resource constraints, information problems, or agency
costs at the level of case selection”); supra notes 6, 55, 62 and accompanying
text.
166. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 325–30 (describing helpful mechanisms,
e.g., “pairing offset with non-preclusion” and using “claims-processing rules,”
like stays, notice requirements, and timing rules, for intervention).
167. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1551–67; infra Part II.A.3.
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mandatory arbitration—trends that now pose an existential
challenge to the private enforcement of public law.168 Meanwhile, budgetary constraints and a new level of deregulatory fervor are shrinking already limited public agency capacity for enforcement litigation, with reverberations likely felt long into the
future.169 This Part provides the context in which enforcement of
public law now lies and argues that, as a normative matter, with
both halves of the hybrid enforcement system equally hobbled,
co-enforcement is a necessary response to ensure an appropriate
level of public law enforcement. It begins by tracing procedural
trends that now hamper private plaintiffs’ ability to enforce public law in the courts, and political trends that now hamper public
agencies’ own enforcement capacities. It then considers how
moving to integrated, rather than parallel and separate, enforcement could resolve these constraints. It concludes by considering
potential normative counterarguments.
Notably, this Part rests on an underlying assumption that a
decline in the amount of enforcement litigation pursued is undesirable. If fewer lawsuits are filed and pursued, why is that necessarily a bad outcome? Does it instead reflect increased compliance with the law, or increased alternative dispute resolution? It
is true that some part of a decline in enforcement litigation may
be due to these welcome factors; but another, more significant
part of any such decline is now, or will soon be, due to constraints
on enforcers’ abilities to pursue litigation.170 This Article presumes that maintaining a visible level of robust enforcement litigation signals that complying with the law and its regulations
matters—and that failing to comply comes with serious economic
risks that outweigh its benefits.171
A. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT DEFICITS
For over a decade, legal scholars have been documenting
how procedural jurisprudence has become increasingly hostile to

168. See infra Part II.A.
169. See infra Part II.B.
170. See infra Part II.A.
171. This Part also assumes that, to protect the public interest, federal agencies should be actively carrying out their mandates to enforce laws and regulations against those who violate them. If one disagrees with that premise, there
will be little appeal in co-enforcement’s ultimate goal of more effective enforcement.
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civil litigation plaintiffs, limiting access to federal courts.172 This
drift stands to have a profound impact on the ability of private
litigants to help enforce public laws. Without rehashing the vast
scholarship on the trend away from private civil litigation, this
Section seeks to highlight three separate jurisprudential trends
that have now created a perfect storm of limitations on private
attorneys general: increasingly mandatory arbitration, intensified pleading standards, and restrictions on class action certification.173
1. Mandatory Arbitration
While arbitration has long been a part of business law practice, the past decade of Supreme Court jurisprudence on mandatory arbitration clauses has altered the field, expanding the use
of arbitration to block litigation in key areas of public law like
employment, consumer, and antitrust. In a series of decisions
between 2009 and 2018, the Supreme Court upheld the enforceability of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses, thus foreclosing litigation, against an increasingly compelling series of legal arguments.174 To do so, the Court majority drew a distinction
between a statutory right in a federal law and the legal forum—
federal court or private arbitration—in which that statutory
right may be enforced.175 The majority held so over dissenters’
repeated arguments that the distinction between rights and forum was meaningless for any federal statute primarily enforced
through a private right of action.176
The new jurisprudence of arbitration began in 2009, in 14
Penn Plaza v. Pyett,177 in which the Court effectively overruled
long-standing precedent to hold that a union’s agreement to arbitrate could waive an individual employee’s choice of judicial
forum in the employee’s own lawsuit to enforce an individual
right guaranteed by a federal statute.178 The Court found no legal distinction between individual arbitration agreements and
172. See infra notes 203–05, 225–27, 248 and accompanying text.
173. See also Bornstein, supra note 28, at 123–25, 142–53.
174. See id. at 124, 146–51.
175. See id. at 146–51.
176. See id.
177. 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
178. Id. at 260–68 (effectively overruling Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974), and holding that individual employees who experienced age
discrimination could not file a lawsuit in federal court because the union they
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those signed by a union,179 ignoring Justice Souter’s dissent that
a private right of action was a “vital element” of federal antidiscrimination suits, essential to “vindicat[ing] the important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices.”180 The next year, in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson,181 the Court
held that an employee alleging race discrimination was compelled to arbitrate even his challenge to whether the mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration agreement he signed was enforceable.182
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia laid the foundation for
the cases that followed, reasoning that any contract with an arbitration clause must be enforced under the Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925 (FAA) unless invalid as a matter of contract law.183
This became binding precedent, despite the fact that the FAA
was intended to allow arbitration among equally-situated business entities, not to force citizens seeking to enforce their statutory rights to give up judicial fora.184
In later cases, the Court held that not only could plaintiffs
be required to arbitrate federal statutory claims, but they could
be required to do so on an individual basis—even if that meant
their claims would not be pursued at all.185 In a 2011 consumer
belonged to had agreed to an arbitration clause in its collective bargaining
agreement with the employer—despite the fact that the union declined to represent the employees in their claims).
179. Id. at 258.
180. Id. at 278 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Bornstein, supra note 28, at
146–47.
181. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
182. Id. at 65–68, 73–75 (distinguishing a challenge to the fees arrangement
for the delegation provision from a challenge to the delegation provision itself).
183. Id. at 67–68. Because “[t]he FAA reflects the fundamental principle
that arbitration is a matter of contract,” Scalia wrote, it “places arbitration
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts . . . and requires courts to
enforce them according to their terms . . . [unless] invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability’”—none
of which were alleged in this case. Id. (citation omitted).
184. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1642–43 (2018) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
185. The first case in this series was Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., in which the Court held that, where the parties disagreed
over whether the arbitration agreement included class claims, the arbitrator
exceeded his authority under the FAA by allowing the arbitration to proceed on
a class-wide basis. 559 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2010). But see Oxford Health Plans
LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013) (upholding an arbitrator’s decision to allow
arbitration on a class-wide basis where the parties agreed to submit the question, on which the arbitration agreement was silent, to the arbitrator).
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case, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,186 the Court upheld a mandatory arbitration clause in an adhesive contract for cell phone
services that waived customers’ rights to pursue claims on any
class-wide basis, including in class arbitration.187 Writing for the
dissent, Justice Breyer argued that, because each consumer’s
damages amount to roughly $30 in fees, requiring individual arbitration would “have the effect of depriving claimants of their
claims” (while providing AT&T with a huge windfall in the aggregate).188
In a 2013 antitrust case American Express v. Italian Colors
Restaurant,189 the Court compelled individual arbitration, rejecting even its own prior precedent on an “effective vindication”
exception to the FAA when an arbitration agreement “operat[ed] . . . as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue
statutory remedies.”190 Again, the cost to prove the case ($1 million or more in expert fees) dwarfed a plaintiff’s individual damages ($39,000 at most); yet the Court found that mandating individual arbitration “does not constitute the elimination of the
right to pursue that remedy.”191 In a scathing dissent, Justice
Kagan called the holding “a betrayal” that would lead to “poorer
enforcement of federal statutes” and arbitration agreements so
“pointless” that they are, in effect, “backdoor waivers of statutory
rights.”192
Then, in a 2018 employment case, Epic Systems Corp. v.
Lewis,193 the Court held that the FAA preempts even another
federal statute that conflicts with an agreement to arbitrate.194
Employees seeking to enforce their right to fair pay under the
186. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
187. Id. at 336–48 (holding that the FAA preempted state law that would
have rendered the contract unconscionable because “nothing in [the FAA] suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of [its] objectives” of enforcing contracts to arbitrate, thus
preempting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)).
188. Id. at 365.
189. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
190. Id. at 242 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)); see also Bornstein, supra note 28, at
148–49.
191. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 234–38.
192. Id. at 239–45 (Kagan, J., dissenting). See also Bornstein, supra note 28,
at 149.
193. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
194. Id. at 1623–24.
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federal Fair Labor Standards Act argued that arbitration agreements requiring them to waive any class-based remedies violated their right under the National Labor Relations Act “to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid
or protection” at work.195 The Court majority, once again, rejected the argument as preempted by the FAA because holding
“an agreement ‘illegal’ as a matter of federal statutory law” still
“impermissibly disfavors arbitration.”196 The dissent, by Justice
Ginsburg, described the majority decision as “egregiously wrong”
and warned about its impact on the private enforcement of public law:
The inevitable result of today’s decision will be the underenforcement of federal . . . statutes designed to advance the well-being of vulnerable workers . . . The U.S. Department of Labor . . . and state attorneys general can uncover and obtain recoveries for some violations . . . . Because of their limited resources, however, government
agencies must rely on private parties to take a lead role in enforcing
wage and hours laws . . . . If employers can stave off collective employment litigation aimed at obtaining redress for wage and hours infractions, the enforcement gap is almost certain to widen.197

With this suite of cases, the Court has now prioritized the
FAA’s protection of arbitration clauses over all else—with deep
implications for private enforcement of federal public laws.198 Indeed, under long-standing FAA precedent, a plaintiff’s federal
statutory rights may be included in an arbitration agreement
and need not be heard only in federal court.199 But allowing resolution of federal statutory claims through private arbitration
was meant to provide plaintiffs with more choices of forum and
greater enforcement opportunities.200 The Court has now twisted

195. Id. at 1624; see 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
196. Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1623–24.
197. Id. at 1633, 1646–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
198. See also David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CAL. L. REV. 985,
985, 1009–30 (2017) (“Arbitration can dramatically alter the returns from enforcement of statutes with incentives for private civil litigation.”).
199. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)
(explaining that “statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA” (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))); Bornstein, supra note 28,
at 150.
200. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29 (noting that “arbitration agreements . . . ‘serve to advance the objective of allowing [plaintiffs] a broader right
to select the forum for resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise’”
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this option into something that can be mandatorily compelled on
an individual basis, effectively foreclosing enforcement of countless claims. Data shows that, in the wake of the Court’s recent
precedent, employer and business use of arbitration clauses—
including those waiving rights to any class claims—are on the
rise.201 Worse still, current jurisprudence has emboldened efforts
to require arbitration in other areas of federal statutory law
where arbitration clauses did not exist—for example in corporate
charters or by-laws for public corporations, with the potential to
cut off shareholder derivative actions to enforce securities
laws.202
As legal scholars have noted, the Court’s most recent decade
of arbitration jurisprudence prioritizing the FAA over all else
has created a coming crisis in limiting access to the courts.203 As
a result, the impact on the private enforcement arm of hybrid
(quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483
(1989))); Bornstein, supra note 28, at 150.
201. See, e.g., Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“Few employers imposed arbitration agreements on their employees in the
early 1990’s. After Gilmer and Circuit City, however, employers’ exaction of arbitration clauses in employment contracts grew steadily. . . . [I]n response to
subsequent decisions addressing class arbitration, employers have increasingly
included in their arbitration agreements express group-action waivers.” (citations omitted)); KATE HAMAJI ET AL., ECON. POL’Y INST., UNCHECKED CORPORATE POWER: FORCED ARBITRATION, THE ENFORCEMENT CRISIS, AND HOW
WORKERS ARE FIGHTING BACK 3 (May 2019), https://www.epi.org/files/
uploads/Unchecked-Corporate-Power-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/A27E-6YUP]
(“By 2024, more than 80 percent of private-sector, nonunion workers will be
blocked from court by forced arbitration clauses with class- and collective-action
waivers.”).
202. See Hal S. Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1187, 1189 (2013); Alison Frankel, The Case Against Mandatory Shareholder Arbitration, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-otc-arbitration/the-case-against-mandatory-shareholder-arbitration
-idUSKCN1L7282 [https://perma.cc/8BWB-6TWN].
203. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 627–30 (describing “the game-changing edict that companies . . . may simply opt out of potential liability by incorporating class action waiver language in their standard
form contracts,” and that “most . . . of the companies that touch consumers’ dayto-day lives can and will now place themselves beyond the reach of aggregate
litigation”); Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80
BROOK. L. REV. 1309 (2015); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704, 720–27 (2012);
see also Bornstein, supra note 28, at 149–50 (citing scholarship).
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enforcement systems stands to be extreme. If forced to arbitrate,
many private citizens will forgo enforcement actions altogether.
And, if forced to arbitrate individually, many class actions essential to enforcing public laws will never be brought.204 Even if a
private enforcer is willing to arbitrate to enforce a federal statute, the deterrent effect of arbitration is entirely undermined by
the lack of publication or confidentiality requirements of most
arbitration resolutions, which remove any signaling effect to
other potential defendant-violators.205 To the extent that hybrid
enforcement systems rely on private litigation, compelled arbitration jurisprudence poses a grave threat to the enforcement of
public law.
2. Intensified Pleading Standards
For those private plaintiffs seeking to enforce public law
who are allowed to litigate rather than compelled to arbitrate,
another recent procedural development poses a second obstacle:
intensified federal court pleading standards.206 Around the same
time as the Supreme Court began its move toward increasingly
compelled arbitration, it also made a significant procedural move
toward requiring more from plaintiffs’ initial pleadings to begin
a lawsuit.
Since 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
enacted, Rule 8(a) had established a broad standard for complaints filed in federal court, referred to as “notice pleading.”207
As the Court described it in the 1957 case Conley v. Gibson, a
plaintiff need only provide “a short and plain statement of the
claim”208 showing that “the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.”209 This

204. See supra Part II.A (discussing additional constraints on class action
doctrine).
205. See, e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 935–50, 959–60 (2006) (analyzing the shift toward
confidential settlements of civil rights claims and its consequences).
206. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 123–25, 142–46 (discussing pleading
standards cases).
207. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court,
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 288–89, 333 (2013).
208. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
209. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiffs must also state “grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1), and “a demand for the relief sought,” FED.
R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3).
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broad standard served the goal of the Federal Rules “to do substantial justice,”210 the Court explained, and established that a
complaint should be dismissed only when “it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.”211
In two cases decided in 2007 and 2009, the U.S. Supreme
Court upped the ante for what a plaintiff must include in a court
pleading to survive a motion to dismiss, moving from a standard
of “notice pleading” to a requirement of “plausible pleading.”212
In 2007, in antitrust case Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,213 the
Court majority reinterpreted Conley and all of its subsequent
precedent, reasoning that the “no set of facts” language in Conley
had been misapplied: it was not meant to create a “minimum
standard of adequate pleading” but, instead to “describe[] the
breadth” of possible proof for an “adequate complaint.”214 The
Court established a new standard for Rule 8(a): a complaint
pleaded with enough facts to “plausibly suggest[]” rather than
be “merely consistent with” the plaintiff’s alleged claims.215 Applying this standard, the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims that
telephone and internet service providers had conspired to set
prices under the federal Sherman Act because their complaint
failed to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible.”216 As it did in the context of compelled arbitration,217 the Court’s dissent argued that this changed standard
would limit private enforcement of public law. Writing for the
dissent, Justice Stevens explained that Congress’s choice to allow for treble damages and attorneys’ fees in the Sherman Act
showed “inten[t] to encourage . . . private enforcement of the

210. Conley, 355 U.S. at 48 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f) (2006) (amended
2007)). Rule 8(f) is now Rule 8(e) and reads: “Pleadings must be construed so as
to do justice.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e).
211. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (emphasis added).
212. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
213. 550 U.S. at 562 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45).
214. Id. at 562–63.
215. Id. at 557–58.
216. Id. at 570.
217. See supra notes 188, 192, 197 and accompanying text.
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law,”218 which made it especially important to “not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically
set forth by Congress.”219
Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,220 the Court clarified
that its holding in Twombly applied beyond antitrust matters to
all federal pleadings when it dismissed the civil rights claims of
a Pakistani detainee alleging abuse in federal custody for failing
to meet the new “plausibility” standard.221 The Court elaborated
on its Twombly test, describing it as a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense”222—a standard that has only contributed to
further subjectivity and confusion for plaintiffs seeking to file
federal lawsuits to enforce public law. Justice Souter, who had
sided with the majority in Twombly, authored the Iqbal dissent,
in which he criticized the majority for reading the pleadings so
narrowly as to “den[y] [plaintiff] Iqbal a fair chance to be
heard . . . .”223
As with the trend toward compelled arbitration,224 the shift
to plausible pleading has sparked analysis that goes well beyond
the scope of this Article—both legal scholarship on its impact on
plaintiffs’ complaints225 and empirical studies on its effect on
case dismissal rates.226 Yet while the overall picture may be inconclusive, one data point is clear: private lawsuits in which
218. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Id. (quoting Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454
(1957)).
220. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
221. Id. at 678, 684 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading
standard for ‘all civil actions’ . . . .” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)).
222. Id. at 679.
223. Id. at 692 (Souter, J., dissenting).
224. See supra Part II.A.1 (examining this trend).
225. See, e.g., SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: SLAMMING THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOORS? 79–126 (2013) (studying
this impact); Miller, supra note 207, at 331–39, 346–47 (describing the two cases
as “a procedural ‘sea change’ in plaintiffs’ ability to survive the pleading stage”);
A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1713 (2013) (studying this trend); see
also Bornstein, supra note 28, at 144–45 (citing scholarship); Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1567–68, 1604–06 (describing same).
226. See, e.g., DODSON, supra note 225, at 83–106; Patricia Hatamyar Moore,
An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U.
RICH. L. REV. 603, 604–07 (2012); Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss,
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there is information asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants—such as an employee’s discrimination lawsuit against an
employer or a consumer’s antitrust lawsuit against a corporation—are the most likely to be impeded by the intensified pleading standard.227 Thus, for public law statutes in which a private
right of action is essential to enforcement, like Title VII or the
Sherman Act, requiring more information at the outset of a case
prior to discovery poses an additional challenge for those acting
as private attorneys general.228
3. Narrowed Class Action Doctrine
Lastly, should private plaintiffs escape compelled arbitration and plead plausibly enough to survive a motion to dismiss,
a third procedural trend may still preclude private enforcement:
limitations on class action certification.229 While efforts to reign
in class actions are not new, like arbitration and pleading standards, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area has created additional hurdles.230
As Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang document, it was
not long after the increase in federal statutes establishing private enforcement in the 1960s that the executive branch shift to
6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011) (examining dismissal rates); Suzette M. Malveaux,
The Jury (or More Accurately the Judge) Is Still Out for Civil Rights and Employment Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 727–43 (2013); see also
Bornstein, supra note 28, at 144–45 (citing scholarship).
227. See, e.g., DODSON, supra note 225, at 108–12; Patricia W. Hatamyar,
The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L.
REV. 553, 597, 609, 630 tbl.D (2010); Malveaux, supra note 226, at 721 n.10;
Moore, supra note 226, at 618–19; Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common
Sense: A Social Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 4, 35–38 (2011); Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly
Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1618–21
(2011) (examining this impact); see Bornstein, supra note 28, at 144–45 (citing
scholarship). But see David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (discussing impact of empirical methodology on assessments of Twombly and Iqbal impact).
228. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 144–45.
229. See id. at 123–25, 151–54.
230. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1603–06. For a detailed history on the rise of the class action device and clashes over its interpretation and
limitation from the 1950s to the 1990s, see generally David Marcus, The History
of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U.
L. REV. 587 (2013) and David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action,
Part II: Litigation and Legitimacy, 1981–1994, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785
(2018).
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Republican control under President Reagan sparked a desire for
deregulation and, with it, a project of “litigation reform.”231 The
Reagan administration recognized that, as private enforcement
of federal law grew, it posed “an obstacle to their regulatory reform agenda.”232 In particular, Burbank and Farhang explain,
the administration set their sights on statutory fee-shifting provisions that they believed “forced business and government to
pay the attorneys[ ] . . . of plaintiffs who launched invasive, disruptive, and costly lawsuits . . . .”233 Throughout the 1980s, the
administration sought to pass legislation that would cap or do
away with attorneys’ fees or punitive damages for enforcement
of federal statutes but, with a few exceptions, were unsuccessful.234
The Reagan administration did, however, succeed in positioning deregulation supporters on the Federal Rules Committee
and in the courts.235 As a result, the “litigation-friendly” Federal
Rules that had been established in 1938 and amended to support
private enforcement through fee shifting in class actions in 1966
were further amended in 1998 and 2003 to the opposite end.236
As amended, Rule 23 adopted more stringent notice and opt-out
procedures and modified attorneys’ fees awards, reflecting the
Committee’s belief that “large attorney fees in the absence of
meaningful recoveries by class members . . . brings the civil justice system into disrepute.”237
Meanwhile, federal courts began to move in the same direction, with decisions on requirements and burdens for evidence

231. See Burbank , supra note 6, at 1544–46.
232. See id. at 1551–52.
233. See id. (“Reagan himself was openly hostile to liberal public interest
lawyers, characterizing them in the early to mid-1970s as ‘a bunch of ideological
ambulance chasers doing their own thing at the expense of the . . . poor who
actually need help’ and as ‘working for left-wing special interest groups at the
expense of the public.’” (quoting Ronald J. Ostrow, Legal Services Agency Battles
Reagan Attempt to Cut Off Its Funding, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1981, at B1)).
234. See id. at 1552–55, 1562–65 (noting narrow coverage of federal statutes
in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1996, and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)).
235. See id. at 1567–68, 1583–605 (discussing the Advisory Committee).
236. See id. at 1583–605.
237. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 215 F.R.D. 158,
183–99, 194 (2003).
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that made it harder for plaintiffs’ to certify a class.238 This trend
culminated in 2011, in the Supreme Court’s decision in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,239 in which, as Burbank and Farhang
note, it came as “no surprise” that interpretation of requirements
for class certification “ha[d] been stretched to the breaking
point.”240 In Wal-Mart, a case in which private plaintiffs alleged
employment discrimination in violation of federal law, the court
adopted a new, more stringent interpretation of Rule 23 and reversed the appellate court decision granting class certification.241 To meet the “commonality” requirement for class certification under Rule 23, the Court held it was no longer enough to
ask whether “there are questions of law or fact common to the
class;”242 plaintiffs must show that class treatment would “generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”243 Then, to decide if plaintiffs met this new standard, the
Court looked beyond certification issues to the underlying merits
of the case and held they had not. According to the Court majority, the plaintiffs’ evidence lacked “some glue holding the alleged
reasons for all those [discriminatory] decisions together” and
failed to prove commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).244 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, criticized the Court majority for
merging Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) and going too far into the merits at the class certification stage, “disqualify[ing] the class at
the starting gate” of its enforcement action.245
The Court also held, for the first time, that cases seeking
more than “incidental” monetary damages accompanying injunctive relief must follow “opt-in” procedures for determining class
members under Rule 23(b)(3), rather than “opt-out” procedures

238. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1603–04 (examining this
trend).
239. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
240. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1603–04.
241. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 342–43, 346, 367.
242. Id. at 349–51 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)).
243. Id. at 349 (quoting Richard Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of
Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)); see Bornstein, supra note 28,
at 150–52.
244. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 344, 349–52, 354–57; see Bornstein, supra note
28, at 150–52.
245. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 368, 377 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see Bornstein, supra note 28, at 150–52.
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under Rule 23(b)(2),246 likely increasing the cost to plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue class claims and limiting the size of the class
for those that do.247
As with arbitration and pleading trends, the literature on
class action reform is large and robust, a review of which is beyond the scope of this Article.248 But, given that class actions are
an essential tool for private enforcers—especially when an individual plaintiff’s recovery is too small to warrant the cost and
effort of litigation—the trend toward increasing the costs and
procedural hurdles for class certification under Rule 23 also
threatens statutory enforcement.249
* * *
As the many dissenting Justices in the Court’s recent jurisprudence on mandatory arbitration, pleading standards, and
class actions identify, the available forum and the procedural
rules applied in it may determine whether a federal statutory
right can ever be enforced by a private attorney general. The
combined result of these three legal developments has yet to be
fully felt. Yet, there is no doubt that, together, the trends will
sharply curb the reach of private enforcement of public law in a

246. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359–65, 367–77 (the Court was unanimous on
this point); see also Bornstein, supra note 28, at 150–52.
247. See Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications
of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 51–52 (2011).
248. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a
More Functional Rule 23, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1098, 1105–14 (2013)
(detailing “a long line of restrictive federal court decisions that extends back
almost fifteen years and . . . greatly limited access to the class action device”);
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1606–08; Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline
of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013). An entire body of work focuses
on the Wal-Mart decision’s negative impact on private enforcement of civil
rights. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 123–25, 151–54; Malveaux, supra note
247, at 51–52; Seiner, supra note 118, at 1350–51; Michael Selmi, Theorizing
Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 500–01 (2011). But see Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren
Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases Challenging Subjective
Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 435 (2012) (suggesting a more limited impact).
249. Procedural limits on class certification are further compounded by the
separate trend of upholding mandatory arbitration agreements that include
waivers of any class claims, as described previously. See supra notes 193–201
and accompanying text.
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hybrid system—in effect, undermining Congress’s direction for
how its statutes should be enforced.250
B. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT DEFICITS
Turning to the other half of hybrid enforcement mechanisms, public enforcement efforts also now face unprecedented
challenges and limitations. Of course, federal agencies have always operated with limited resources determined by federal government budgets. Even scholars critical of rent-seeking private
class action attorneys acknowledge that a major advantage of allowing private enforcement is its ability to multiply overall enforcement resources.251 Likewise, scholars who argue in favor of
predominantly public enforcement regimes or who propose
stronger public oversight of private attorneys general recognize
that, to do so, requires leveraging the finances of the private
bar.252 Without repeating these concerns, this Section adds contemporary context, highlighting that a new level of economic and
political pressure toward deregulation, exacerbated by recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence, now stands to limit public agency
enforcement into the future.253

250. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1605–06 (“[T]he Supreme
Court—whose members are . . . insulated from individual if not institutional
reprisal—can bring about momentous civil litigation reform that would be impossible to secure from the legislature or its delegated procedural lawmaking
bodies . . . . [Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Iqbal] involved ‘interpretations’ that are
inimical to private enforcement . . . .”); supra notes 167–71 and accompanying
text.
251. See, e.g., COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 18–
30; Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 218–25 (discussing this
advantage).
252. See, e.g., Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1384
(explaining finances); Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 623.
253. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger & Paul Kiel, After Budget Cuts, the IRS’ Work
Against Tax Cheats Is Facing “Collapse,” PROPUBLICA (Oct. 1, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/after-budget-cuts-the-irs-work-against-tax
-cheats-is-facing-collapse [https://perma.cc/L8ES-VGBP]. But see Jonathan
Remy Nash et al., The Production Function of the Regulatory State: How Much
Do Agency Budgets Matter?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 695, 734–41 (2017) (describing
the complex, non-linear relationship between agencies’ budgets and their effectiveness).
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1. Executive Preferences and Budget Constraints
Discretionary budgets and federal agency spending have
risen and fallen over time, usually in line with changes in executive branch preferences between Republican and Democratic
administrations. Since the rise of federal statutes with hybrid
regimes in the 1960s,254 most Republican presidential administrations have expressed preferences for smaller government
and, with it, smaller discretionary agency budgets than have
most Democratic administrations.255 In over five decades since
the creation of many federal agencies, this has led to ebbs and
flows in support for agencies’ enforcement efforts, within a reasonable range of variation.256
In the most recent decade, however, economic and political
trends have triggered a notable change in the usual federal
budgeting process,257 representing a serious threat to reliable
levels of public agency enforcement. First, the Great Recession
254. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 6, at 3–4, 31–34; Burbank
et al., supra note 1, at 644.
255. Note, however, that a preference for apportioning less of the federal
budget to federal agencies has not necessarily translated into less government
spending overall, due to some Republican presidents’ choices to increase defense
spending, institute tax cuts, or take other government-funded fiscal measures
to stimulate the economy. See, e.g., Kimberly Amadeo, Republican Presidents’
Impact on the Economy, THE BALANCE, (June 25, 2019), https://www
.thebalance.com/republican-presidents-economic-impact-4129133 [https://
perma.cc/NZY4-HKHK]; Gabriel Florit, et al., 40 Years of Budgets Show Shifting National Priorities, WASH. POST (March 17, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/budget-hitory/?utm_term=
.54b46b1269be [https://perma.cc/5VZC-ELRN].
256. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, TABLE
4.1–OUTLAYS BY AGENCY: 1962–2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2019/03/hist04z1-fy2020.xlsx [https://perma.cc/V6SV-43SX]; OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, TABLE 4.2—PERCENTAGE
DISTRIBUTION OF OUTLAYS BY AGENCY: 1962–2024, https://www.whitehouse
.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/hist04z2-fy2020.xlsx [https://perma.cc/SF3G
-3SKP] (showing proportion of discretionary budget assigned to federal agencies
relative to defense and other major categories of spending over time). For analysis of “the budget as a method through which the White House can control
agencies’ policymaking,” see generally Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget
as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182, 2187 (2016).
257. Since the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
the usual federal budgeting process is that Congress must draft and authorize
the federal government’s budget annually in conjunction with the President.
Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–688
(2012)).
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of 2008 required significant investment by the Obama administration to spur economic recovery, affecting immediate federal
budgeting priorities.258 Second, partly in response to government
intervention in the economic crisis, in 2009 a new political movement known as the Tea Party took root, arguing for drastically
reduced federal government which it viewed as impeding free
market principles.259 Political success by the Tea Party in the
mid-term elections of 2010 led to a new era of contentious budget
fights. During this period, a Republican-led Congress enacted
the Budget Control Act of 2011,260 which placed limits on discretionary spending and set triggers for budget “sequestration”
through at least the year 2021.261
Then, in 2013, disputes over the federal budget and funding
for the Affordable Care Act led the entire federal government to
be shut down for sixteen days, for the first time in nearly two
decades.262
The political support for smaller government was further reflected in the election of populist Republican President Donald

258. Brian Knowlton, Obama Presses for Action on the Economy, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 8, 2009), https://nytimes.com/2009/01/09/us/politics/09obamacnd.html?
SeachResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/N727-TB2H].
259. Michael Ray, Tea Party Movement, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Tea-Party-movement [https://perma.cc/
5DDP-UW9A].
260. Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901
(2012)).
261. Later amended to increase sequestration caps and extend mandatory
spending cuts through 2023 by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub.
L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013) and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013,
Pub. L. No. 113-67, 127 Stat. 1165.
262. There have long been disputes over the federal budget between presidents and Congress when they represent different political parties, but recent
trends reflect greater gridlock. It was not until 1980 that budget disputes resulted in shutting down the federal government and, between 1980 and 1995,
budget disputes resulted in federal government closures for a cumulative total
of seventeen days. See Mihir Zaveri et al., The Government Shutdown Was the
Longest Ever. Here’s the History., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-government-shutdown.html [https://
perma.cc/UB7C-BDMB] (last updated Jan. 25, 2019). Since 1995, however, government shut downs have become a more frequently used political tool, resulting in five different shut downs lasting a cumulative period of seventy-nine
days. See id.
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Trump in 2016.263 As of the time of publication of this Article,
the current Trump administration has been among the most rigorous and aggressive in enacting its deregulatory agenda. In his
first year in office, President Trump planned to slash some federal agency budgets by up to thirty percent,264 and proposed a
forty-two percent cut in non-defense discretionary funding in
2019 (including a thirty-four percent cut to the EPA and a
twenty-one percent cut to the Department of Labor).265 Trump
also selected cabinet members to lead federal agencies that reflected his deregulatory preferences, several of whom were actively hostile to their agencies’ own missions.266 Under the current Trump administration, the clear priority is to undo past
regulations and strip away public regulatory enforcement in all
areas of law.267
If the damage to federal agency enforcement efforts were
simply a matter of executive branch preferences, however, those
263. See, e.g., Will Weissert, Smaller Government? Some Trump Supporters
Cheer the Shutdown, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.apnews
.com/35303676b04144ffbd3e463d3addb2ba [https://perma.cc/C4W7-Q2HF].
264. Lisa Rein & Andrew Ba Tran, How the Trump Era Is Changing the Federal Bureaucracy, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/politics/how-the-trump-era-is-changing-the-federal-bureaucracy/2017/12/
30/8d5149c6-daa7-11e7-b859-fb0995360725_story.html [https://perma.cc/S6GU
-22RF]; see also Julia Manchester, Most Key Federal Agencies Have Cut Staff
Under Trump: Report, THE HILL (Dec. 31, 2017), https://thehill.com/homenews/
administration/366925-most-key-federal-agencies-have-cut-staff-under-trump
-report [https://perma.cc/4UQ3-3YJ7].
265. Dylan Matthews, Trump’s 2019 Budget: What He Cuts, How Much He
Cuts, and Why It Matters, VOX (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and
-politics/2018/2/12/16996832/trump-budget-2019-release-explained
[https://perma.cc/8M8Q-2ZUA].
266. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Pruitt’s Successor Wants Rollbacks, Too. And
He Wants Them to Stick, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/07/27/climate/andrew-wheeler-epa.html [https://perma.cc/BZ83-K6DQ];
Hallie Jackson & Kristen Welker, Trump Picks Energy Department Opponent
Rick Perry for Energy Secretary: Sources, NBC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2016),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-picks-energy-department
-opponent-rick-perry-energy-secretary-sources-n695241 [https://perma.cc/
DLZ9-NHW2]; Pruitt Publicly Admits He Wanted to Get Rid of the EPA, NAT.
RES. DEF. COUNCIL (July 17, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/trump-watch/pruitt
-admits-he-wants-get-rid-epa [https://perma.cc/52E9-JYW2].
267. See Nolan D. McCaskill & Matthew Nussbaum, Trump Signs Executive
Order Requiring that for Every One New Regulation, Two Must Be Revoked, POLITICO (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-signs
-executive-order-requiring-that-for-every-one-new-regulation-two-must-be
-revoked-234365 [https://perma.cc/Z2Z4-YK52].
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could change with a new presidential administration. Yet with
widespread political and legislative support for smaller government, President Trump was also able to pass significant tax cut
legislation that stands to raise the deficit and dramatically reduce discretionary spending budgets for future administrations,
too.268
2. A New Era in Campaign Finance
Beyond general economic and political pressures toward
limiting federal government budgets, a more seismic shift toward deregulation threatens any future rebound in public enforcement levels: recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence reshaping campaign financing. In two major decisions in the past
decade, the Court put its thumb on the scale of political contributions in ways likely to exert intense political pressure away
from public regulatory enforcement in perpetuity.269
First, in the 2010 case Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,270 the Court struck down certain restrictions on
campaign expenditures, holding that they violated free speech
provisions guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.271 The decision
allows corporations, labor unions, and others to make unlimited
political contributions so long as they are not directly linked to a
specific party or candidate.272 As a result, one political reporter
described, a “deluge of cash poured into . . . political action committees” (or PACs), much of it “‘dark money’ [that] never has to
be publicly disclosed.”273
While Citizens United removed limits on spending on both
those who favor a robust regulatory environment (for example,
268. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054; Jim
Tankersley, How the Trump Tax Cut Is Helping to Push the Federal Deficit to
$1 Trillion, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/
business/trump-corporate-tax-cut-deficit.html [https://perma.cc/H7UW
-NC8W].
269. Or until legislation changes this balance—a proposition made all the
more unlikely by the reality that those who would legislate must fundraise to
win election to their legislative seats.
270. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
271. Id. at 335–66.
272. See id.; Gabrielle Levy, How Citizens United Has Changed Politics in 5
Years, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2015/01/21/5-years-later-citizens-united-has-remade-us-politics
[https://perma.cc/RZ77-AWSM].
273. Levy, supra note 272.
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labor unions) and those who oppose it (for example, corporations), in reality, the playing field is not level. With union membership at an all-time low of, in 2018, just 10.5% of all U.S. workers and only 6.4% of private sector workers,274 union dues are no
match for the combined contributions of business interests and
high-wealth individuals to PACs.275 Over half of the states have
so-called “right-to-work” laws that allow workers protected by a
union to opt out of all union dues, including both any portion of
dues that go to political spending and any non-political “agency
fees” meant to cover the cost of collective bargaining with the
employer.276
More importantly, in a second recent decision, the 2018 case
Janus v. AFSCME,277 the Supreme Court upheld a “right-towork”-style exemption for all public sector employees,278 who
compose nearly half of all union members in the United
States.279 The Court held that all public sector employees—who
already had the ability to opt-out of their unions’ political contributions280—could opt out of their union agency fees, too, reasoning that to rule otherwise would “compel[ employees] to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern” in

274. Tal Axelrod, Union Membership Falls to Historic Low, THE HILL (Jan.
18, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/news/426026-union-membership-falls
-to-historic-low/ [https://perma.cc/SST8-FW5L]; Press Release, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Union Members Summary, (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news
.release/union2.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/3LYT-F6T2].
275. See, e.g., Curtlyn Kramer, Vital Stats: The Widening Gap Between Corporate and Labor PAC Spending, BROOKINGS (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www
.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/03/31/vital-stats-corporate-and-labor-pac
-spending/ [https://perma.cc/QRC3-JU3F].
276. Right to Work Frequently-Asked Questions, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND., https://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-frequently-asked
-questions/ [https://perma.cc/R3JH-H92G].
277. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
278. Id. at 2486.
279. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 274 (stating that 7.2 million of
14.7 million unionized workers work in the public sector).
280. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that
the Court’s prior precedent in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209
(1977), already held that “a government entity could require public employees
to pay a fair share of the cost that a union incurs when negotiating on their
behalf over terms of employment[, b]ut [that] no part of that fair-share payment
could go to any of the union’s political or ideological activities”).
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violation of the First Amendment.281 Whether public sector employees will now opt out of union dues en masse remains to be
seen; but data from right-to-work states indicates that a significant decline is possible.282
This jurisprudence stands to dramatically shift the future of
political contributions away from legislators and executive
branch officials who would favor active public enforcement litigation against public law violators283—a new political reality
that changes the public agency side of the hybrid enforcement
equation. Believing that the federal government will maintain
or increase its current level of regulatory enforcement—or could
increase capacity to allow for greater public oversight over private class action attorney enforcers—may now be unrealistic.

281. See id. at 2460–86 (majority opinion); Dylan Matthews, 6 Excerpts that
Explain the Supreme Court’s Big Anti-Union Ruling: Janus v. AFSCME Is a
Very, Very Big Deal, VOX (June 27, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/27/
17509460/supreme-court-janus-afscme-public-sector-union-alito-kagan-dissent
[https://perma.cc/J2Y8-WVXZ].
282. Frank Manzo, IV & Robert Bruno, After Janus: The Impending Effects
on Public Sector Workers from a Decision Against Fair Share, ILL. ECON. POLICY
INST. (May 8, 2019), https://illinoisepi.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/ilepi-pmcr
-after-janus-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7CT-J78A].
283. This trend stands to affect even Democrats who wish to win legislative
seats at the federal level, at least as it relates to regulation in industry sectors
more likely to fund Democrats, like financial services and the technology industry. See, e.g., Alan Zibel, Plutocrat Politics: How Financial Sector Wealth Fuels
Political Ad Spending, PUB. CITIZEN (May 15, 2019), https://www.citizen.org/
article/plutocrat-politics-how-financial-sector-wealth-fuels-political-ad
-spending/ [https://perma.cc/TCL3-4LF8]. Certainly, the success of progressive,
grassroots-funded candidates like U.S. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders call this prediction into question. See, e.g.,
Christopher Ingraham, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Received 62 Percent of Her
Funding from Small-Dollar Donors. The Average House Member Received Less
than 8 Percent, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/business/2018/12/21/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-received-percent-her
-funding-small-dollar-donors-average-house-member-received-less-than
-percent/ [https://perma.cc/SL8D-3HG7]; Holly Otterbein & Maggie Severns,
Bernie’s New Approach to Raising Cash: ‘Grassroots Fundraisers,’ POLITICO
(May 22, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/22/bernie
-sanders-money-1337897 [https://perma.cc/X6TG-EULX]. But a federal budget
that sets funding levels for federal agencies must be passed by an entire Congress of legislators, all of whom need campaign contributions to maintain their
seats.
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C. COLLABORATIVE SOLUTIONS TO ENFORCEMENT DEFICITS
Both public and private halves of current hybrid enforcement schemes now face critical levels of constraint. On the one
hand, federal agencies created by Congress to enforce public law
statutes are hamstrung by slashed budgets and intense deregulatory political preferences, limiting their capacity to litigate enforcement actions.284 On the other, private attorneys general are
limited by jurisprudence on compelled arbitration, pleading
standards, and class action certification, reducing their incentives to take on risky litigation that serves a public good and, if
a mandatory individual arbitration clause applies, barring them
from doing so entirely.285 Given this new normative reality, this
Section argues that a proposal of co-equal co-enforcement has
much to offer, providing needed resources to public enforcers
while helping private enforcers overcome procedural hurdles.
On the public enforcement side, collaboration offers the obvious advantage of providing desperately needed litigation financing to public agencies with limited budgets.286 Private attorneys general fund their cases through attorneys’ fees,
contingency fees, and private litigation financing mechanisms,
all guided by their estimate of the value of the case rather than
a narrow federal budget.287 Combining forces also provides public agencies with additional person-power, and at a high level of
expertise when those private attorneys are experienced in litigating complex class actions.288 These observations are not new:
legal scholars have long identified similar advantages of the private bar—even those scholars ambivalent about or seeking to
reign in entrepreneurial private attorneys general.289 Yet co-enforcement arrangements offer an important advantage over others’ proposals to expand public oversight of private attorneys
284. See supra Part II.B.
285. See supra Part II.A.
286. See supra Part II.B.
287. See, e.g., Financial Management in a Contingent Fee Practice,
FINDLAW, https://practice.findlaw.com/financing-a-law-firm/financial
-management-in-a-contingent-fee-practice.html [https://perma.cc/WJ46-P55Q].
288. See, e.g., Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 225; Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2149–50.
289. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 6, at 314–15 (describing how “public and
private enforcers draw on different resource pools” and “existing redundant-authority regimes are often justified on this basis”); Coffee, Rescuing the Private
AG, supra note 6, at 225; Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2149–50.
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general.290 A collaborative co-counsel approach recognizes that
private attorneys, many of whom have deep expertise and lucrative class action practices, may bristle at the idea of serving as
contract attorney “agents” for public agencies that they may perceive as overly bureaucratic—and for whom they are footing the
bill. Indeed, despite three decades of academic calls for federal
public oversight over private class action attorneys291—and even
in the wake of new procedural restrictions on private attorneys292—there is little evidence that deputization schemes have
been widely adopted at the federal level.293 As described in Part
III, each enforcer in a co-enforcement scheme would be co-equal
in authority and would share in the financing of its own efforts,294 likely a more attractive option for the private bar.
On the private enforcement side, collaboration offers the advantage of helping private plaintiffs’ attorneys overcome each of
the three areas of procedural litigation reform calcified in Supreme Court jurisprudence in the past decade.295 For areas of
public law affected by mandatory arbitration agreements, including employment, consumer, and antitrust claims, private attorneys may no longer be able to litigate at all without joining

290. See, e.g., Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 263; Gilles &
Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 630–31 (“[B]y leveraging the private bar,
the state AGs [bringing parens patriae suits] can recoup vast amounts of money
for their citizens and reap commensurate political credit.”); Rubenstein, supra
note 6, at 2163–64.
291. See, e.g., Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 263.
292. See supra Part II.A.
293. In contrast, outsourcing work to private plaintiff ’ s attorneys is more
common at the state level. See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Lawyers Create Big Paydays by
Coaxing Attorneys General to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www
.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/us/politics/lawyers-create-big-paydays-by-coaxing
-attorneys-general-to-sue-.html [https://perma.cc/B3FB-SX64] (documenting
that at least nine states’ Attorneys General have hired private plaintiff ’ s attorneys to litigate some parens patriae lawsuits on behalf of citizens). In addition,
private plaintiffs’ attorneys have teamed up with each other to respond to their
procedural challenges—for example, to file coordinated arbitrations en masse
in the face of class action litigation waivers. See, e.g., Jon Steingart, Class Actions Waived? Workers File Hundreds of Solo Arbitrations, BLOOMBERG: DAILY
LAB. REP. BLOG (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/
X5FLC604000000?bna_news_filter=daily-labor-report&jcsearch=BNA%252
00000015f6ebcd98ea15f7ebe4f3e0000#jcite [https://perma.cc/L5S9-KVKK].
294. See infra Part III.B.
295. See supra Part II.A.
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forces with a public agency that is not bound by individual private agreements to arbitrate.296 Likewise, the upfront costs and
risk involved in modern class certification procedures may pose
too difficult a hurdle for many plaintiffs’ attorneys to overcome.
As described in Part III, this challenge may be overcome by cocounseling with a public agency not required to comply with Rule
23 to bring systemic cases.297 And, while pleading requirements
under Rule 8, as recently interpreted in Twombly and Iqbal,
would apply equally to complaints filed by public and private attorneys, private attorneys may benefit from the substantial investigatory resources and pre-discovery subpoena power of public agencies, whose access to information at an earlier phase in
the case may help ensure surviving a motion to dismiss.298
After decades of litigation reform efforts to address fears
about profit-motivations in the private attorney general
model,299 there are new concerns that the pendulum has swung
too far in the opposite direction, limiting access to the courts for
federal statutory claims that rely on private enforcement.300 In
an era of strong and well-funded public agencies, such concerns
might have been assuaged by a sense that public enforcers could
pick up the slack, stepping in where private enforcers are now
constrained.301 That, however, is not today’s reality. Strong deregulatory preferences, exacerbated by corporate campaign financing, in the wake of years of litigation reform stand to wreak
havoc on public law enforcement. As scholars have documented,
296. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 123–25, 146–67; Gilles & Friedman,
After Class, supra note 6, at 630–31, 660, 669; infra Part III.A.
297. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 123–25, 146–67; infra Part III.A. Gilles
and Friedman identified similar advantages in their proposal for increased
state parens patriae cases in consumer, employment, and other areas likely to
lose private court access due to recent jurisprudence on arbitration and class
actions. See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 660 (“[P]arens patriae suits are not subject to Rule 23 or contractual waiver provisions, and so
avoid the majority of impediments to contemporary class actions.”). Again, and
beyond the context of parens patriae suits, a co-enforcement approach is unique
in that federal enforcement agencies and private attorneys general would collaborate as equal partners, not as principal and agent, making the private bar
likely more willing to provide its resources to gain the public agencies’ procedural advantages. See infra Part III.
298. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 123–25, 146–67; infra Part III.A.
299. See supra notes 10–11, 39–40, 23, 92, 107 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text.
301. Indeed, scholars have called for this. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, After
Class, supra note 6, at 630–31; Seiner, supra note 118, at 1352–53.
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public laws enacted by Congress with hybrid enforcement mechanisms rely on the robust participation of private enforcers,302
and public agency budgets are designed with the expectation
that the private bar will fill an enforcement gap.303 Each side of
a hybrid enforcement scheme is now operating with one hand
tied behind its back. From a normative perspective, public-private co-enforcement offers the chance to combine the two remaining hands to ensure one strong, united enforcement presence.
D. CHALLENGES FOR THE NORMATIVE CASE
Given current constraints on both halves of hybrid enforcement mechanisms, the normative value of co-enforcement
should be apparent to those who value enforcement of federal
statutory law. Yet while it offers solutions to existing enforcement challenges, a proposal for co-equal collaborative enforcement must also function in the real world, and has some normative counterarguments.
As raised previously, one major challenge from a theoretical
perspective is that public and private enforcers have different,
sometimes seemingly conflicting goals.304 The normative counterpart to this theoretical challenge is that public and private
enforcers may have different, sometimes seemingly conflicting
cultures, too.305 Public enforcers may necessarily have to operate
more slowly, with more hierarchy, bureaucracy, and thrift than
private enforcers would like. Private enforcers may, also out of
necessity, move more quickly, with less structure and more improvisation than public enforcers would like. Both actors may
also have assumptions or perceptions about reputational harm
from associating with the other—for example, perceptions that
private class action attorneys are out for themselves, that public
agencies are inefficient, or that courts prefer one or the other.
There is no easy answer to this challenge except that, as described in Part III, through communication, building upon
known relationships, and trial and error, enforcement cultures

302. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 75–80 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text.
305. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 171–72; Clopton, supra note 6, at 308;
Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2137–42.
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can blend and co-exist.306 The significant upside to working
through such cultural challenges is that each enforcer offers
strengths that helps shore up the other’s weaknesses, providing
the chance to reach a happy medium on structure, speed, thrift,
and reputational perception.
A more difficult cultural obstacle is posed by public agency
leadership that is truly hostile to the agency’s own mission or
duty to enforce regulation—in which case neither public nor private attorneys would likely want to work with the other. This
was true to some extent during the Reagan administration,307
and appears even more so in the current Trump administration.308 In some cases, this cultural conflict may pose too great
an obstacle to overcome. Yet even the agency heads most opposed
to regulation may still pursue limited, select enforcement action,
creating areas of overlap that provide opportunities for collaboration. For example, even Scott Pruitt—the Trump administration’s former Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator who was notorious for opposing the EPA and its
regulations309—initiated enforcement actions against those who
were the very worst violators of environmental laws, Superfund
sites.310 A trend toward deregulation and limited enforcement
budgets may be the new norm, but it need not entirely preclude
collaboration. Pushing to find areas of overlap where co-enforcement can occur is arguably even more important during deregulatory executive administrations, when resources for public enforcement are at their lowest.
Another normative challenge for co-enforcement is that,
where efforts are combined, public and private enforcers will
have to give up some amount of their autonomy and resolve any

306. See also infra Part III.B.
307. See, e.g., Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1552–54 (describing
Reagan Administration strategy to limit enforcement through “demobiliz[ing]
the administrative regulatory enforcement apparatus,” while also limiting “private enforcement”); supra notes 231–35 and accompanying text.
308. See, e.g., supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., Civil Cases and Settlements, U.S. EPA, https://cfpub.epa.gov/
enforcement/cases/ [https://perma.cc/3DL5-J9KL]. Nevertheless, it is hard to
imagine a co-counseling arrangement between an EPA led by Scott Pruitt and
a private plaintiffs’ firm or public interest firm that practices environmental
law.
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“turf” issues.311 Public agencies will likely resist having to share
the lead in litigation, but—as left unaddressed by other scholarly
proposals312—so, too, will experienced private attorneys. Both
sides will have to compromise and work out leadership roles
which, again, can be an advantage as the division of labor could
allow each side to take the lead for certain tasks making better
use of resources. Having to work out litigation roles should not
pose an insurmountable challenge. The same is required by any
one enforcer acting alone, whether public agency team or a private plaintiffs’ firm, any time more than one attorney works on
the same matter.
Since a collaborative approach would likely supplement rather than replace parallel hybrid enforcement, both public and
private enforcers may also have concerns about being precluded
in future separate suits or in strategic follow-on suits.313 For example, why would a public agency open itself up to future case
preclusion by private settlement or arbitration? Again, this may
be a benefit rather than a detriment as both enforcers would be
involved in the original preclusive suit, so any concerns about its
future impact could be resolved up front.314 Preclusion may not
always be bad for enforcers, or be equated with under-enforcement.315 Certain follow-on suits may benefit from the preclusive
effects of having the strongest enforcement cases resolved
first.316 And, while not every individual harmed by an entity that
violates public law may be able to recover, the deterrent effect of
one strongly prosecuted joint case may do more to encourage legal compliance than many non-preclusive private settlements.
Lastly, if capture or bias is a theoretical concern of co-enforcement,317 self-interested resource preservation is its normative equivalent. Public and private enforcers, both of whom may
perceive themselves to be more resource-constrained,318 may be
311. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 171–72; see also supra notes 103–04
and accompanying text (discussing lessons from the work of Fine).
312. See, e.g., COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 219–
36; Gilles & Friedman, Exploding the Myth, supra note 6, at 116–17; Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2149–55.
313. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 323–24.
314. See id. at 319–25.
315. See id. at 314–17.
316. See id. at 329–30.
317. See supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
318. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 309 (“Scholars have argued about whether
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resistant to share their own limited resources with one another.
This may be both the biggest hurdle to overcome and the biggest
potential advantage to public-private co-enforcement. If public
agency and private attorney enforcers develop trust and working
collaborative relationships, both stand to gain greatly by leveraging additional resources and skilled person-power.319 As described further in Part III, co-equal, co-counseled arrangements
offer the advantage that each half of the enforcement equation
can primarily fund their own activities, without one side taking
on a significant financial burden for the other, yet still reaping
the benefits of the others’ expertise and participation.320
***
As this Part has shown, considering a move from parallel
hybrid enforcement to integrated co-enforcement may now be
necessary to ensure appropriate levels of public law enforcement. Integrating public agency and private plaintiff’s attorney
enforcement efforts in a co-equal fashion on a subset of key public law litigation stands to help overcome the current challenges
facing each. Public agencies can gain valuable expertise and
needed litigation resources to fill gaps left in the wake of deregulatory political pressures. Private plaintiffs’ attorneys can gain
essential investigatory resources to ensure “plausible” pleading,
and may be able to leap some hurdles posed by mandatory arbitration and class certification. Yet even if a co-enforcement approach is both theoretically sound and normatively necessary,
that does not mean it is doctrinally and practically possible. This
Article now turns to that task, looking to existing hybrid statutes
and related case examples to point the way.
III. DOCTRINAL & PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
PUBLIC-PRIVATE CO-ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION
Since the rise of federal statutes creating hybrid enforcement schemes in the 1960s,321 federal public agency attorneys
and private plaintiffs’ attorneys have been litigating on separate, parallel tracks to enforce many of the same public laws.
Yet, as this Part details, there have been moments of overlap and
public or private enforcers are comparatively more resource constrained, but it
seems reasonable to assume that their resources differ . . . .”).
319. See id. at 314–15.
320. See infra Part III.B.
321. See supra Part I.A.1.
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coordination that provide the groundwork for greater collaboration. This Part turns to the challenge of how to accomplish integrated public-private co-enforcement partnerships in practice. It
first analyzes any overarching doctrinal challenges to combined
enforcement raised by constitutional, statutory, and procedural
law. It then provides a conceptual framework for how to create
collaboration, drawing on existing examples of intersection between public and private enforcers. This Part is intended to provide an overview that can serve as the basis for future work,
tracking specific examples of a public-private co-enforcement litigation model.
A. DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK: CAN WE DO THIS?
Congress has adopted hybrid enforcement schemes in a wide
array of federal public law, including environmental, consumer,
employment, antitrust, and securities protections. The specific
legal steps required to pursue a co-enforcement approach will require looking to the specific context—to each federal statute and
the authority of its enforcement agency. Yet doctrinal challenges
to co-enforcement are likely to fall into three main areas of concern: constitutional considerations, statutory hurdles, and procedural constraints. This Section considers the overarching issues arising in each.
1. Constitutional Doctrine
Considered broadly, the U.S. Constitution poses no obvious
obstacles to collaborative public-private enforcement litigation.
Co-enforcement would combine the efforts of private actors and
federal agencies both already authorized by Congress to enforce
federal statutes. Thus, it does not implicate separation of powers
doctrine, which requires independent authority of each of the
three branches of government under Articles I through III of the
U.S. Constitution.322 Article II has been interpreted to vest enforcement power for federal law with the executive branch.323
Yet where Congress enacts a statute that creates a hybrid enforcement scheme through litigation by both a federal agency
controlled by the executive branch and a private right of action
to individuals, either of which has discretion to litigate cases before the judiciary, no one branch’s power has been usurped by
322. See Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1433–39.
323. See id.
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another.324 To the extent that these issues have already been resolved in the context of statutes that authorize private attorneys
general or citizen suits, the same precedent applies.325 Simply
combining two types of properly vested enforcement authority
does not change this analysis.326
It is true that, in a collaborative regime, both public and private enforcers would be co-equal, and the public enforcer would
not be able to quash or totally control the lawsuit.327 Co-enforcement as envisioned by this Article, however, would neither compel a public enforcer to join a case it did not wish to pursue, nor
to pursue a case in a fashion with which it disagreed. Because
the federal agency could either decline to pursue a case collaboratively at the outset or withdraw its representation, should
some insurmountable dispute arise with private attorney cocounsel over how to pursue the case, the agency would maintain
its independence.328
Co-enforcement arrangements also raise no issues with constitutional standing. The federal statutes to which this Article’s
proposal applies already vest enforcement authority in both a

324. See id. at 1434–35 (citing and applying cases to her proposal to deputize
private citizens to bring federal civil rights cases).
325. See id. at 1433–39.
326. Any perceived conflict here would relate to issues of capture, bias, or
conflict of interest, which are theoretical and normative problems, not constitutional ones. See supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
327. This stands in contrast to Gilles’s proposal of delegating authority for
private attorney civil rights suits, in which she noted: “Private enforcement regimes are vulnerable to separation of powers challenges where the executive
does not retain sufficient control over the processes of initiating, conducting,
and terminating litigation. The deputation model . . . provides for genuine executive ‘control’ . . . through . . . executive power to quash a private . . . suit at any
stage.” Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1438–39. It also
stands in contrast to Gilles & Friedman’s proposal of parens patriae suits by
state AGs using private attorneys, in which the authors explained that, politics
aside, “there is little to stop state AGs from engaging private law firms on a
contingent fee basis to pursue claims in parens patriae on behalf of injured state
residents,” so long as the attorneys general retain “total control over all key
decision making . . . .” Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 669.
328. Because the parties maintain co-equal authority and the private enforcers would not gain “deputized” power through the executive agency, but rather
maintain it through Congressional enactment, there are also no concerns raised
by Article II’s Appointments Clause. Compare the private attorney as agent
model of Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1442–49.
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federal agency created by the statute and in citizen plaintiffs empowered through a private right of action.329 As required by Supreme Court interpretation of Article III, a private attorney general must demonstrate its interest in enforcing the law through
its own injury-in-fact.330 As proposed, a co-enforcement scheme
would focus on combining the efforts of federal agencies created
to enforce statutes with those of private plaintiffs enforcing statutory private rights of action to redress their own injuries—
meaning that each half of the collaborative team would have its
own independent ground for standing.
2. Statutory Doctrine
Beyond constitutional concerns, a second doctrinal challenge may be any specific barriers to co-enforcement arrangements contained in the text or interpretation of the relevant federal statute. While a complete analysis of any particular
arrangement would require a deeper, statute-specific analysis,
some general principles apply.
For many federal statutes in which Congress has created a
hybrid enforcement scheme of federal agency and private right
of action, it has also authorized intervention by one enforcer in a
case brought by the other,331 laying the foundation for collaboration. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows

329. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1) (2012) (“[T]he [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission may bring
a civil action against any respondent . . . . [I]f within [the relevant time period] . . . the Commission has not filed a civil action . . . a civil action may be
brought against the respondent named in the charge . . . by the person claiming
to be aggrieved or . . . if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission,
by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful
employment practice.”).
330. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 6, at 316 n.199 (noting that “citizen-suit
plaintiffs must show an ‘injury in fact’ to have standing” (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–78 (1992))); Rubenstein, supra note 6, at
2145 (noting that, for example, “environmental citizen-suit plaintiffs must show
their own personal interest in a matter prior to filing suit in federal courts,”
making them “those who enforce public policy by pursuing their own interests,”
while “a qui tam relator . . . ha[s] standing derivative of the government’s standing, an assignee of the government’s interests”). Qui tam suits are beyond the
scope of this Article’s proposal.
331. See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012); 47 U.S.C.
§ 402 (2012) (FCC decision judicial review); see also Clopton, supra note 6, at
329 & n.278–79 (providing examples of public intervention in private cases and
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individual plaintiffs to intervene in an enforcement action
brought by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on their behalf, and it allows the EEOC to intervene
in a case brought privately by plaintiffs.332 After intervention,
both enforcers continue on in the litigation on behalf of the
named plaintiffs.333 Likewise, while the Clean Water Act requires a private plaintiff to provide notice to the EPA before filing a citizen suit and bars private suits for injuries that the EPA
is “diligently prosecuting,” the Act also allows “any citizen [to]
intervene as a matter of right” in such a suit.334 For these and
similar statutes, current law permits joint enforcement. If one
enforcer may intervene after the lawsuit is filed by the other,
there is nothing in the statute that should prevent joint enforcement from the outset by creating a co-counseling arrangement
and filing the case together.335
For other statutes, however, when the government agency
intervenes in a private plaintiff’s lawsuit, it displaces the authority of the private plaintiff. For example, private plaintiffs
may file lawsuits for violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act without first filing charges with the U.S. Department
of Labor (DOL).336 If, however, they do file a charge and the DOL

vice versa and noting that “courts have various capabilities that can improve
coordination between seemingly separate proceedings”).
332. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012) (“[T]he Commission may bring a civil
action against any respondent . . . . The person or persons aggrieved shall have
the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission . . . . [A] civil
action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge . . . by the
person claiming to be aggrieved or . . . if such charge was filed by a member of
the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the
alleged unlawful employment practice . . . . [T]he court may . . . permit the Commission . . . to intervene in such civil action upon certification that the case is of
general public importance.”).
333. See, e.g., Bornstein, supra note 28, at 160–62 (discussing the examples
of Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 673 (5th Cir. 1985); United Telecomms., Inc. v. Saffels, 741 F.2d 312, 313–14 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1060 (1985)).
334. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2012); see also Clopton, supra
note 6, at 305.
335. See infra Part III.B.
336. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216–217 (2012); see also
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #44: VISITS TO EMPLOYERS (2015), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs44.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2P7X-T7LQ].
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decides to intervene, the agency takes over the case on the plaintiff’s behalf, replacing private counsel.337 Similarly, private
plaintiffs may file a lawsuit under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act seeking civil damages
against a fraudulent telemarketer or an injunction to enforce
compliance with federal law, but must notify the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) that it has done so, at which point the FTC
may intervene.338 However, when the FTC or Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection files such a lawsuit, private plaintiffs may not institute a suit of their own against the same defendant for the same violation.339 For statutes like these, a truly
collaborative arrangement may not be possible without first
amending the rule or reinterpreting the precedent that requires
plaintiff displacement. Where changing existing rules remains
impossible, public and private enforcers could still collaborate
through an arrangement in which the agency hires and delegates its authority to private attorneys, as other scholars have
proposed.340
3. Procedural Doctrine
A final overarching doctrinal concern for co-enforcement is
whether the procedural constraints on private enforcement
raised in Part II could somehow nullify the procedural advantages gained by partnering with public enforcers.341 As
raised previously, private enforcement efforts have been dramatically hampered by recent Supreme Court precedent intensifying
337. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216–217; see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 336.
338. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 6104(a)–(b) (2012); see also Clopton, supra note 6, at 304 n.129.
339. 15 U.S.C. § 6104(c). The same holds true for state attorneys general who
bring parens patriae suits on behalf of their citizens for telemarketing fraud.
See 15 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012).
340. See generally Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6 (discussing
antitrust and securities cases), Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra
note 6 (private civil rights cases); Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6,
at 668–70 (state parens patriae cases); Rubenstein, supra note 6 (same).
341. See supra Part II.A. Gilles & Friedman raised similar concerns when
proposing state parens patriae actions to overcome compelled individual arbitration. See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 664–68 (“To what
extent do the challenges that have hobbled class actions pose a threat to parens
patriae actions? . . . As enforceable class action waivers proliferate, we think it
is only a matter of time until a defendant makes the argument that a state AG’s
parens patriae action is barred by the uniform terms of the contracts between
the defendant and the AG’s constituent consumers and workers.”).
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pleading standards, limiting class actions, and increasingly compelling arbitration.342 If public enforcers are not, themselves,
subject to the same limitations, could they become so by co-counseling with private enforcers?
First, recent pleading requirements established by the
Twombly and Iqbal interpretations of Rule 8 pose no doctrinal
obstacle to co-enforcement arrangements because pleading
standards are the same whether the lawsuit is filed by a public
agency or a private attorney.343 This means that, regardless of
whether a public or a private enforcer files the complaint, the
complaint itself must now meet the “plausible” pleading standard.344 Thus, there is no risk that co-counseling with private attorneys should impact a public agency’s ability to meet current
pleading requirements, or vice versa. In fact, as suggested previously, a collaborative approach may be better than a traditional parallel enforcement approach when it comes to meeting
more rigorous pleading requirements.345 Combining private attorneys’ outside information with public agencies’ pre-litigation
investigatory authority will likely improve upon each enforcer’s
current ability to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim under Twombly and Iqbal.346
Second, while class action doctrine’s constraints on private
attorneys do not apply to public agencies, existing intervention
rules make it possible for public and private enforcers to work
together on group-based claims without jeopardizing the public
agency’s procedural advantage. Because private attorneys seeking to pursue class claims must comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, they are directly affected by litigation reform efforts and jurisprudence raising evidentiary standards and making it more difficult to certify a class.347 Federal agencies seeking
to pursue group or “systemic” claims, however, do not have to
342. See supra Part II.A.
343. See supra Part II.A.
344. See supra Part II.A.
345. See supra Part II.C.
346. See supra Part II.C. The one caveat is that, under Iqbal, judges have
been authorized and encouraged to use their own “judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). This allows a slight
opening for public enforcers to be disadvantaged by partnering with private enforcers if a given judge bears animosity toward private class action attorneys,
but that is not a doctrinal hurdle, per se.
347. See supra Part II.A.3.
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comply with Rule 23. Their statutory enforcement authority allows them to litigate harms on behalf of the public interest without class certification.348 Certainly, private plaintiffs’ attorneys
could not seek to, themselves, represent a class and simply evade
Rule 23 requirements by co-counseling with a public agency.
But, under existing procedures that allow private citizens to intervene in public agency enforcement litigation, a private attorney who represents one or more affected individuals could team
up with a public agency who represents the public in a case to
redress the same harm on a group-wide basis.349 So long as the
private attorney focuses on and seeks compensation for representation of their individual clients only, the public and private
attorneys should be able to work together to develop legal theories and litigate the case jointly. Thus, pursuing group-based
claims together may pose a practical challenge for co-enforcers,
but not necessarily a doctrinal one.
The third area of private procedural constraint—jurisprudence upholding mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements—poses a more complicated challenge for co-enforcement
arrangements. As with Rule 23, while private parties may be
compelled to subject their individual claims to arbitration, federal agencies seeking to pursue the same claims are not similarly
affected. Even when a business requires its employees, consumers, or others to waive their rights to bring a lawsuit and agree
to submit any legal claims to arbitration, a federal agency that
enforces those same rights cannot be so limited because the
agency was not a party to the arbitration agreement.350
348. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n,
446 U.S. 318, 320 (1980) (holding that the EEOC did not have to comply with
Rule 23 to bring its own systemic litigation); see also Bornstein, supra note 28,
at 154, 160–63; Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 665 (“Absent a
radical expansion of current doctrine, parens patriae suits are likewise impervious to the increasingly restrictive rules governing class certification.”); cf. id.
at 668 (“One place where AGs do have to make a Rule 23 showing is where the
parties wish to endow their settlement with the res judicata reach of a class
action settlement.”).
349. See supra notes 331–35 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534
U.S. 279, 288–90, 298 (2002) (holding that an employer-employee agreement to
arbitrate employment-related disputes does not bar the EEOC from seeking judicial relief); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991)
(noting that arbitration agreements do not preclude the EEOC from bringing
class-wide suits); see also Bornstein, supra note 28, at 154, 158–60; cf. Gilles &
Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 664–65 (“Facing parens patriae claims
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For example, the EEOC is not barred from pursuing employment discrimination claims on behalf of an employee who files a
charge with the agency, even if the employee signed a mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration agreement.351 In 1991, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the first Supreme Court case to
hold that discrimination claims could be subject to mandatory
arbitration, the Court also held that this did not stop employees
from filing charges with the EEOC.352 Because “the EEOC’s role
in combating . . . discrimination is not dependent on the filing of
a charge . . . and it has independent authority to investigate . . . discrimination[,] . . . arbitration agreements [do] not
preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and
equitable relief.”353 A decade later, in EEOC v. Waffle House, the
Court clarified that, when an employee signed an arbitration
agreement as a condition of getting hired, it did not prevent the
EEOC from pursuing a discrimination case on his behalf, even
though he was not an official party to the lawsuit.354 The arbitration clause neither “materially change[d] the EEOC’s statutory function” nor “place[d] any restriction on a nonparty’s choice
of a judicial forum.”355 Once a charge is filed, the EEOC becomes
“the master of its own case,” able to seek even victim-specific relief for the non-party who filed the charge where it serves a public deterrent purpose: an employer cannot “turn[] what is effectively a forum selection clause into a waiver of [the EEOC’s]
statutory remedies.”356
While this means that a public enforcer can pursue litigation on behalf of groups and even individuals who are, themselves, bound by arbitration agreements not to litigate, it does
that might otherwise have been brought by persons that are bound by arbitration clauses and class action waivers, defendants will argue that agency principles apply, under which an agent is deemed bound by the arbitration agreements of the principal. But the . . . whole idea behind parens patriae suits is
that the state has its own interest at stake in the litigation . . . [which] kicks in
once a sufficient number of its constituents have suffered injury . . . . [C]lass
waivers, in our view, are unlikely to affect parens patriae suits.” (footnotes omitted)).
351. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279; Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; see also Bornstein,
supra note 28, at 154, 158–60.
352. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20, 23–29.
353. Id. at 28, 32 (emphasis omitted).
354. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 282–86.
355. Id. at 288–89.
356. Id. at 291–92, 294–95, 298.
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foreclose the option of private attorney intervention. In the context of the EEOC, courts have held that any individual plaintiff
intervenor in an agency action who is covered by a mandatory
arbitration agreement may be compelled to arbitrate any individual cross-claim against the employer.357 For these and other
areas of hybrid enforcement in which parties may use mandatory
arbitration agreements,358 true enforcement integration may not
be possible. Coordination is important, however, as clients required to arbitrate may seek out private attorneys, who—if they
believe the case to be of significant public interest—may wish to
refer the case to the agency to allow for litigation. In these instances, too, a deputization model, as other scholars have proposed, may still offer a means for collaboration.359
Given the rise of arbitration agreements in certain areas of
public law, creating a system that encourages communication
and, where possible, collaboration between public and private
enforcers is essential to ensuring any adequate level of enforcement. Otherwise, those forced to arbitrate their statutory claims
individually may simply give up.
B. PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK: HOW DO WE DO THIS?
Assuming that all doctrinal hurdles can be overcome so that
a co-enforcement arrangement is possible as a matter of law, the
final question is how to implement it in practice. This Section
suggests that, while achieving a co-equal collaborative publicprivate model of enforcement will require a cultural shift among
enforcers that should not be underestimated, it is otherwise a
simple endeavor as a matter of practice. If public agency and private plaintiffs’ attorneys are willing to try to bridge the divide, a
co-enforcement arrangement can be created and managed, for
357. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 160 n.238 (citing Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc’y, 479 F.3d 561, 568–70, 568
n.2 (8th Cir. 2007)).
358. Note that, while arbitration agreements are common in employment,
consumer, and banking contexts, there are many areas of hybrid enforcement
in which this doctrinal hurdle will not arise, posing no obstacle to public-private
co-enforcement—including the environment, housing, education, securities, and
more.
359. See generally Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6 (antitrust
and securities cases); Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6 (private civil rights cases); Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 668–70
(state parens patriae cases); Rubenstein, supra note 6 (antitrust and securities
cases).
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the most part, by a well-planned co-counseling agreement and
open communication. This Section provides a framework for how
to build a collaborative model, considering four practical areas:
forming a co-enforcement team, dividing up work, resolving conflicts, and financing the litigation. Because the specifics of any
co-enforcement litigation model will depend on the statute and
agency involved, this Section aims to lay the groundwork upon
which future work examining specific co-enforcement litigation
may be built.
1. Forming a Public-Private Co-Enforcement Team
A proposal for integrated enforcement is not designed to replace separate parallel hybrid enforcement, but, instead, to supplement it at a time of unprecedented constraints on both enforcers. For this reason, co-enforcement arrangements could be
entered into selectively for cases that most warrant a collaborative approach. Public agencies could develop an assessment tool
to determine in which types of cases to seek private co-counsel
based on relevant criteria—for example, cases the agency estimates will require over a certain amount of financial resources
or for which there are known individual victims with private
standing. All federal public agencies currently face far greater
demand for enforcement than their resources can cover, so they
already engage in case evaluation to select which of those cases
to litigate.360 Each agency could decide on additional criteria that
triggers them to seek private co-counsel and add this to their existing rubric.
Likewise, private attorneys usually engage in routinized
case intake to assess whether to accept a plaintiff’s case.361 Each
firm could identify and add to their existing intake and decisionmaking process criteria for when to approach the relevant
agency to co-counsel—for example, when pre-litigation investigation or class certification poses a difficult challenge, or when a
suit warrants litigation but individual plaintiffs are covered by
360. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 5 (2017); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL ch. III, at 7 (5th ed. 2012) https://www.justice
.gov/atr/file/761141/download [https://perma.cc/J2TG-YZVR] (last updated Apr.
2018); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT 18 (2006).
361. See, e.g., Will a Lawyer Take My Case?, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS,
https://www.workplacefairness.org/takecase [https://perma.cc/ZM3Z-CNHB].
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mandatory arbitration agreements.362 Moreover, because many
federal statutes with hybrid enforcement schemes allow the
other enforcement entity to intervene,363 public agencies and private attorneys could draw on their existing processes for determining whether to intervene when deciding whether to co-counsel, but do so before the complaint is filed—in effect “pre”intervening.
Once co-enforcement case criteria are established, either
public or private enforcement attorneys could broach the idea of
creating a collaborative team for a particular case based on existing relationships. In addition, or instead, public enforcers
could reach out to the relevant private bar to establish a panel
of private attorneys with whom they could seek to regularly cocounsel. Neither option would require reinventing the wheel; in
many areas of federal statutory enforcement, there are a limited
set of national nonprofit public interest organizations and private law firms that handle a significant portion of enforcement
meant to serve the public interest.364 Establishing a set group of
co-counsels would also reduce transaction costs of co-enforcement over time, given that once a co-counseling agreement is
created, the parties involved may more easily replicate it for future cases.
Of course, any process for how an agency selects co-counsel
would need to be transparent and ensure against favoritism to
avoid “pay-to-play” concerns raised by other scholars’ proposals
for deputization schemes.365 But because each half of a co-equal
362. See supra notes 348–56 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 331–35 and accompanying text.
364. See, e.g., Rankings: Most Feared Plaintiffs Firms, LAW360, https://
www.law360.com/rankings/most-feared-plaintiffs-firms [https://perma.cc/LH29
-RFG2]; The Top 50 of 2018, ISS, https://www.issgovernance.com/library/the
-top-50-of-2018/ [https://perma.cc/75L2-KLU4]; Public Interest Law Firms,
YALE LAW SCHOOL, https://law.yale.edu/student-life/career-development/
students/career-guides-advice/public-interest-law-firms [https://perma.cc/32YS
-CAQ3]; Private Public Interest and Plaintiff’s Firm Guide, HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL, https://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/private-public-interest-law-and
-plaintiffs-firm-guide/ [https://perma.cc/4QC3-LSUK].
365. See supra Part II.C; see also Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note
6, at 670–71 (applying a similar rationale to their suggestion of more State AG
parens patriae cases, with outsourcing to private attorneys: “The public-private
partnership model, properly implemented, has the potential to replace th[e] unseemly scrum [of private law firms vying for lead counsel position] with a transparent process, in which the AGs select their cocounsel in conformity with whatever state laws and practices might exist governing state contracting . . . [and]
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co-enforcement team would be responsible for generating its own
funding, this would be a less onerous burden. While critics could
still raise concerns that agencies are directing business to certain private co-counsel, there would be no public funds going to
those attorneys.366
2. Dividing Work
Once a public-private team is formed, and assuming there is
no specific statutory bar to a co-equal relationship, most other
issues can be resolved by a clear and detailed co-counseling
agreement. Indeed, as documented in recent legal scholarship,
the judiciary is increasingly accepting of and deferential to privately arranged procedure.367 Unless a relevant statute imposes
a barrier, how co-counsel divides work can be a matter of private
contract.
Again, creating a co-enforcement co-counseling agreement
should not require starting from scratch: enforcers could look to
existing models and arrangements they already use when working with other attorneys. For example, many, if not most, complex private class actions are brought by multiple plaintiffs’ attorneys or firms working together, sometimes with the pro bono
department of a defense or corporate firm.368 Such arrangements
already contemplate things like whether there will be a lead
counsel, which firms or attorneys are responsible for which case
duties, responsibilities of each to include the other in strategic
decisions, and so on.369 Likewise, many federal agencies engage
in agreements with other state or federal agencies with whom
they share overlapping enforcement authority. For example the
EEOC establishes a work-sharing agreement with each state
act[ ] as a filter . . . against unmeritorious cases on which private lawyers might
otherwise [pursue] in order to exploit in terrorem effects.”).
366. See infra Part III.B.4.
367. See, e.g., Robin J. Effron, Ousted: The New Dynamics of Privatized Procedure and Judicial Discretion, 98 B.U. L. REV. 127, 128–39 (2018).
368. For example, in the Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. class action lawsuit
alleging sex discrimination under federal Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, fifteen different attorneys from five different law firms and four non-profit
organizations were listed as counsel of record for plaintiffs. See Brief for Respondents, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (No. 10-277),
2011 WL 686407.
369. See, e.g., Model Co-Counseling Agreements, ASS’N OF PRO BONO COUNSEL (Jan. 21, 2015), https://apbco.org/model-co-counseling-agreements/ [https://
perma.cc/VX3X-QALJ].
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Fair Employment Practices Agency that enforces antidiscrimination law.370 And the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice has established procedures for how to work jointly and
cooperatively with other public agencies with whom their responsibilities overlap, including both the FTC and the antitrust
divisions of state attorneys general.371
By starting with existing co-counseling or work-sharing
agreements and negotiating any additional issues at the outset,
public and private enforcers can likely resolve how to divide responsibilities, as well as establish a process for making any future decisions throughout joint litigation.372
3. Resolving Conflicts
Similarly, collaborative enforcement teams could work to
anticipate and resolve up front any likely sources of conflict that
may arise. Existing co-counsel agreements each enforcer uses
with other attorneys or agencies likely also provide examples of
resolutions to known conflicts. For example, model co-counseling
agreements from the Association of Pro Bono Counsel include
clauses addressing issues that could lead co-counsel to clash,
such as priorities related to settlement, liability for any sanctions imposed, and contact with the media.373 More importantly,
the co-counseling agreement could establish procedures for resolving any conflicts that may arise in the future—for example,
submitting any unresolved conflict to mediation or arbitration,
or agreeing to abide by a named plaintiff/client’s decision.374

370. See, e.g., Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs) and Dual Filing,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/
fepa.cfm [https://perma.cc/RCR4-7BFX]; FY 2012 EEOC/FEPA Model Worksharing Agreement, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www
.eeoc.gov/employees/fepa_wsa_2012.cfm [https://perma.cc/BEU9-LSFR].
371. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL
ch. VII, at 3–29 (5th ed. Nov. 2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761161/
download [https://perma.cc/C8U6-4YU8].
372. Enforcement does not have to mean litigation, but mediated settlements or arbitration should have a class/systemic component or injunctive relief
that the presence of the public agency can ensure post-Concepcion. For a discussion of how federal agencies are responding to mandatory arbitration, see
generally Daniel T. Deacon, Agencies and Arbitration, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 991
(2017).
373. See, e.g., Model Co-Counseling Agreements, supra note 369.
374. See, e.g., id.
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Another potential conflict involves ethical duties to each enforcer’s “client”—a challenge that, once resolved, may in fact be
a strength of co-equal, collaborative enforcement. In a co-enforcement arrangement, the private plaintiffs’ attorney will be
duty-bound first to the individual named client or clients who
brought the case, while the public agency will be first responsible
to the public interest. Once again, this is nothing new to experienced attorneys, who must strike similar balances often, for example, when two attorneys represent multiple parties in the
same case, or even when a single attorney faces a settlement offer that will cover their costs or achieve their goals but fall short
of the client’s desires.
For many, if not most, cases, particularly those pursued as
a class action or systemic litigation, these interests will largely
overlap. The individual plaintiff’s interests may be best served
by both a damage award and injunctive relief to correct and deter
future harm by the defendant; the public’s interests are represented by the individual plaintiff, who is a member of the injured
public. Both public and private enforcers play a role in both compensation and deterrence.375 And it is exactly where individual
victim interests and the larger public interests diverge, that coenforcement may offer its greatest reward. To the extent that
private enforcement of public law has been subject to the criticism that it creates “agency costs,”376 the ethical duties of public
enforcer co-counsel can provide a check on private attorney “entrepreneurialism,” to ensure that enforcement is truly serving
both harmed individuals and the public to which they belong.
4. Financing Litigation
The final and most complicated element of putting co-enforcement arrangements into practice is how to finance the litigation. Generally speaking, public enforcement litigation is
funded through the federal agency’s budget, with the focus of the
recovery being injunctive relief and damages that go to the injured public, whereas private plaintiffs’ attorneys fund their litigation through a combination of attorneys’ fees allowed by statute and contingency fees for a portion of plaintiffs’ damages

375. See supra notes 76–80, 154–57 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
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award.377 Yet this is not always the case. Some federal statutes
allow public agencies to seek reimbursement through fines, fees,
or a portion of damages recovered, too.378 Funding arrangements
for co-enforcement litigation would have to be statute-specific,
made in accordance with any statutory requirements limiting
litigation damages to the public agency. That said, so long as all
attorney time is tracked and all monies collected and distributed
according to the law, there is nothing to stop each enforcer from
seeking reimbursement for the portion of work they did on the
case in the manner in which they usually do so.
Should a statute forbid public agency collection of attorneys’
fees, co-enforcement provides a significant advantage over other
proposals for agency oversight of private attorneys general379:
because the enforcers act as co-equal co-counsel, the private attorney is not acting as the “agent” of the “principal” public
agency, so should not be limited from seeking attorneys’ fees for
its own documented work.
Once determined up front, any financing arrangement, too,
could be clarified and enforced through a co-counseling agreement. For example, both enforcers could agree to cover their own
costs and expenses incurred for their portion of work on the case
and could detail a method of recordkeeping for attorney work
hours.380 Each could then use those records to access financing
in their usual fashion: the agency incurring costs and fees allowed by their budget, private attorneys seeking attorneys’ fees
for their portion from the court should they prevail in the litigation. Both parties would be responsible for financing their own
portion of work just as they do when multiple private firms cocounsel, more than one public agency enforces the same case, or
a private party intervenes in a federal agency action or vice
versa.
***
From a doctrinal standpoint, the Constitution and most hybrid statutes, themselves, pose no constraints to co-enforcement,
377. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 309 (noting that “some funding mechanisms (e.g., alternative litigation financing and contingency fees) are not
equally available to public and private parties”).
378. See generally id. at 309 n.158.
379. See generally COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at
219–36; Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6; Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 623; Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2129.
380. See, e.g., Model Co-Counseling Agreements, supra note 369.
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and collaboration may be possible despite recent procedural jurisprudence. From a practical standpoint, processes for case selection, division of labor, and litigation financing can likely be
developed from existing tools through co-counseling agreements.
The biggest challenge to implementing co-enforcement, then, is
overcoming professional cultures to build trust and collaboration
between public agency and private plaintiffs’ attorneys who, despite working on the same side of civil law enforcement, may
have reservations about each other’s motivations or practices.
This is no small challenge, but it is also not insurmountable. Private law firms have long co-counseled with one another; state
and federal government agencies collaborate when their enforcement authority overlaps; and many public and private enforcers
are permitted to intervene in each other’s cases. There are existing models from which to draw guidance on how to integrate efforts, and, once public and private enforcers establish one collaborative co-equal partnership, they should be able to replicate it.
Most importantly, given their current limitations, public and private enforcers may no longer have a choice but to work together,
to ensure that the federal rights they both seek to protect are
adequately enforced.
CONCLUSION
The efforts of both halves of what Congress intended to be
two-pronged, overlapping enforcement regimes for federal public
laws have now become seriously constrained. In a series of procedural decisions over the past decade, the U.S. Supreme Court
has limited the ability of private plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue
class actions and, indeed, the very access to federal courts they
need to pursue enforcement litigation.381 During the same time
period, an economic crisis launched a fervent political movement
asserting new pressure to reduce public agency enforcement, exacerbated by recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions unlocking unlimited campaign contributions by those subject to regulation.382
The time is ripe for public and private attorney enforcers to consider combining forces.
Other scholars have proposed creating greater oversight by
public agencies acting as “principals” who delegate or outsource
the work of enforcement litigation to private attorney “agents,”
381. See supra Part II.A.
382. See supra Part II.B.
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either to ensure access to the courts, or to curb the profit motivations of private attorneys.383 Yet this is an arrangement that
may not appeal to private plaintiffs’ attorneys, many of whom
have a deep commitment to the public interest and significant
litigation expertise and successes. Moreover, this “deputization”
model would require a level of resources and capacity for oversight that public agencies now lack.
A public-private co-enforcement approach, in which private
attorneys and public agencies share leadership and resources coequally, would combine each enforcer’s procedural and practical
advantages while balancing their cultures and motivations.384 A
proposal to adopt co-enforcement is not intended to supplant the
current model of separate, parallel enforcement. Instead, it is offered to supplement and enhance existing hybrid regimes for significant cases, to bolster the efforts of each enforcer currently
acting alone.
A collaborative, co-enforcement approach is not a panacea.
It will not resolve entirely a lack of federal agency support or
resources, nor will it reopen the courthouse doors that have now
been closed to private plaintiffs. And it will require enforcers to
rethink how they have done things in the past, to overcome existing cultural norms, and to share leadership over certain cases.
But, in an era of both shrinking private access to federal courts
and intense political and economic pressure away from public
regulation, public-private co-enforcement litigation may now be
a necessity.

383. See supra notes 107–17 and accompanying text.
384. See supra Parts I.B, II.C.

